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ABSTRACT 
Research indicates eyewitness identifications are incorrect approx-
imately one-third of the time in criminal investigations. For years, this 
phenomenon has significantly contributed to wrongful convictions all 
over the country, including in Washington State. But jurors, attorneys, 
and police remain unaware of the nature and extent of the problem and 
continue to give undue weight to eyewitness evidence. Experts have es-
timated that approximately 5,000–10,000 felony convictions in the Unit-
ed States each year are wrongful, and research suggests that approxi-
mately 75% of wrongful convictions involve eyewitness misidentifica-
tion. The phenomenon of eyewitness misidentification is also amplified 
and most troublesome in the context of cross-racial identification—when 
a witness identifies someone of another race. Experimental research sug-
gests that an eyewitness trying to identify a stranger is over 50% more 
likely to make a misidentification when the stranger and eyewitness are 
of different races. Consistent with this finding, approximately one-third 
of wrongful convictions uncovered by DNA analysis nationwide have 
involved whites misidentifying blacks. For these reasons, this Article 
focuses on cross-racial misidentification, and discusses the nature and 
extent of the problem and potential tools for addressing it; however, this 
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Article’s reasoning applies in large part to eyewitness misidentification 
in general. 
The Washington State Supreme Court had two recent opportunities 
to address the issue of cross-racial misidentification in State v. Cheatam 
and State v. Allen. These cases establish that Washington State trial 
courts have broad discretion to permit expert testimony and jury instruc-
tion on cross-racial misidentification when relevant. In light of this prec-
edent, this Article proposes that Washington State trial courts begin ex-
ercising their broad discretion regularly to admit such testimony and in-
struction whenever relevant as an initial step toward preventing wrongful 
convictions and improving our criminal justice system. Going forward, 
additional education and reform efforts will be needed to solve this ongo-
ing problem. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The story of Michael Marshall presents a prime example of how 
undue reliance on eyewitness identification can lead to a wrongful con-
viction.1 The story begins on November 3, 2007, when a woman and her 
son were carjacked at gunpoint.2 Police were called to the scene, spotted 
the woman’s stolen vehicle less than half a mile away, and gave chase.3 
The suspect eventually pulled over the vehicle, ran off on foot, and got 
away.4 But the suspect left behind his shirt, cell phone, and phone case, 
which the police collected as evidence.5 
The police then developed a composite sketch of the suspect based 
on information from the woman’s son, who described the suspect as a 
middle-aged black man.6 Ten days later, the police were called to a near-
by apartment complex where a black man, Michael Marshall, had been 
found unconscious lying in a hallway.7 The police called to the scene 
noticed similarity between Marshall and the composite sketch of the car-
jacker.8 The police then called the woman’s son to the scene, who posi-
                                                 
 1. See Georgia Man Freed After 2008 Conviction Is Overturned, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Dec. 
16, 2009, 1:55 PM), http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Georgia_Man_Freed_After_2008_ 
Conviction_Is_Overturned.php. 
 2. GEORGIA INNOCENCE PROJECT, MICHAEL MARSHALL: BACKGROUND ON THE CASE (2009), 
available at http://www.ga-innocenceproject.org/images/Marshall/GIP-Marshall-Background-12.15. 
09.pdf. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
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tively identified Marshall as the carjacker.9 On this basis, Marshall was 
charged with armed robbery and aggravated assault.10 Facing likely con-
viction and up to twenty-five years in prison, Marshall pleaded guilty to 
theft and was sentenced to serve four years.11 
From prison, Marshall reached out to exoneration advocates, who 
investigated his case and discovered that the carjacker’s shirt, cell phone, 
and phone case never were subjected to DNA testing or otherwise exam-
ined or investigated.12 Marshall’s advocates then obtained an order re-
quiring the evidence undergo DNA testing, and the testing exculpated 
Marshall and matched the DNA of another man.13 After spending more 
than two years in prison for a crime he did not commit, Michael Marshall 
was finally exonerated and freed.14 
Michael Marshall’s story underscores the need to approach eyewit-
ness evidence with caution, and the need to develop and rely on other 
types of evidence in criminal prosecutions. Marshall’s story is only one 
of many throughout the United States involving eyewitness misidentifi-
cation and wrongful conviction.15 A disproportionate number of these 
stories involve cross-racial misidentification in particular—a witness 
misidentifying someone of another race.16 This is consistent with exper-
imental research demonstrating that the risk of mistaken identification is 
uniquely high in the context of cross-racial identification, on top of any 
other factors contributing to eyewitness error.17 In Michael Marshall’s 
case, the race of the police officers and victim who misidentified Mar-
shall is not publicly available information, but it would not be surprising 
                                                 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.; Michael Marshall, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/ 
special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3408 (last visited Dec. 20, 2014). 
 12. GEORGIA INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 2; NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra 
note 11.  
 13. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 11. 
 14. INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 1. 
 15. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Devenport et al., Effectiveness of Traditional Safeguards Against 
Erroneous Conviction Arising from Mistaken Eyewitness Identification, in EXPERT TESTIMONY ON 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 51 (Brian L. Cutler ed., 2009) (“For several 
decades now, scholars and social scientists have studied miscarriages of justice occurring in the 
American legal system and have drawn the same conclusion: Mistaken eyewitness identifications is 
the leading cause of wrongful convictions.” (citations omitted)). 
 16. See, e.g., Earl Smith & Angela J. Hattery, Race, Wrongful Conviction & Exoneration, 15 J. 
AFR. AM. STUD. 74, 84 (2011) (“[T]he vast majority of exoneration cases involve a White victim 
who mis-identifies an African American man.”). 
 17. See, e.g., Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-
Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3 (2001) 
(meta-analysis of thirty years of psychological studies demonstrating unique difficulty of identifying 
someone of another race). 
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to find that these individuals were white, for reasons more fully ex-
plained below. 
Beyond causing wrongful convictions, cross-racial misidentifica-
tion also contributes to racial disparity in the criminal justice system.18 
Washington’s Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System re-
cently documented racial disparities throughout Washington’s criminal 
justice system and advocated for ongoing dialogue to address those dis-
parities.19 The Task Force identified cross-racial misidentification as an 
important aspect of the problem.20 This is true for numerous reasons. 
First, research has indicated that white persons are more susceptible to 
committing cross-racial misidentification than racial minorities.21 Se-
cond, members of racial minority groups are more susceptible to cross-
racial misidentification because potential witnesses to crimes are more 
likely to be white.22 Third, once misidentified, racial minorities in Wash-
ington also face disparately higher rates of arrest, charging, and convic-
tion, and also receive harsher sentences, even after controlling for legally 
relevant factors.23 It should not be surprising, then, that African Ameri-
can men are disproportionately represented among exonerees as com-
pared to the incarcerated population in general.24 Efforts to address cross-
racial misidentification thus fall within the broader ongoing efforts in 
Washington to address racial disparities in the criminal justice system. 
Although eyewitness misidentification has received increasing 
scholarly attention in recent years as more and more wrongful convic-
tions resulting from such misidentification have been discovered and 
documented,25 too many persons—including police, attorneys, judges, 
                                                 
 18. See generally Task Force on Race & the Criminal Justice Sys., Preliminary Report on Race 
and Washington’s Criminal Justice System, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 623 (2012) [hereinafter Task 
Force]. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See id. at 668. 
 21. See Meissner & Brigham, supra note 17, at 21 (“Results indicated that White participants 
were more likely to demonstrate [cross-race bias], especially with regard to false alarm responses.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Washington State & County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/53000.html (last updated Feb. 5, 2015, 1:11 PM) (reporting 
that black persons comprise only 4% of Washington’s population whereas white, non-Hispanic 
persons comprise 71%). 
 23. See generally Task Force, supra note 18. 
 24. Smith & Hattery, supra note 16, at 79 (finding that African American men represent 70% 
of exonerees as compared to 40%–50% of incarcerated persons). 
 25. See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 
CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984); Radha Natarajan, Racialized Memory and Reliability: Due Process 
Applied to Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identifications, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1821 (2003); John P. 
Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial Identifications, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 
207 (2001); Christian Sheehan, Making the Jurors the “Experts”: The Case for Eyewitness Identifi-
cation Jury Instructions, 52 B.C. L. REV. 651 (2011); Bethany Shelton, Turning a Blind Eye to Jus-
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and jurors—remain unaware of this phenomenon or its scope.26 Thus, 
much more work remains to be done. With that in mind, this Article 
seeks to supplement the existing literature in a number of distinct ways. 
First, to promote needed incremental change and awareness, this Article 
focuses on cross-racial misidentification as the most pressing eyewitness 
problem, and focuses on two discrete court tools—expert testimony and 
jury instruction—that can be utilized immediately to begin addressing 
the problem. Second, this Article focuses on Washington State, as part of 
the ongoing efforts to improve Washington’s criminal justice system and 
in light of two recent Washington State Supreme Court cases—State v. 
Cheatam27 and State v. Allen28—which acknowledge the problem of 
cross-racial misidentification and establish that Washington State trial 
courts have broad discretion to permit expert testimony and jury instruc-
tion to address the problem. Third, this Article presents a grounded ap-
proach to misidentification issues, with an emphasis on empirical and 
scientific research rather than speculative theory. This approach incorpo-
rates research on the potential effectiveness of expert testimony and jury 
instruction to prevent the wrongful convictions that would otherwise re-
sult from eyewitness misidentifications. 
This Article proceeds in six parts. Part II provides further back-
ground on the issue of eyewitness misidentification and, more specifical-
ly, cross-racial misidentification. Part III argues that, in appropriate cas-
es, the proper admission of expert testimony and jury instruction on 
cross-racial misidentification can prevent wrongful convictions and im-
prove the criminal justice system by helping jurors to properly weigh the 
evidence before them. Part IV explains that under State v. Cheatam, 
Washington trial courts have significant discretion to admit expert testi-
mony on cross-racial misidentification—more discretion, in fact, than 
many in the legal community might expect. Part V explains that under 
                                                                                                             
tice: Kansas Courts Must Integrate Scientific Research Regarding Eyewitness Testimony into the 
Courtroom, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 949 (2008); Derek Simmonsen, Teach Your Jurors Well: Using Jury 
Instructions to Educate Jurors About Factors Affecting the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony, 70 
MD. L. REV. 1044 (2011); Lauren Tallent, Through the Lens of Federal Evidence Rule 403: An Ex-
amination of Eyewitness Identification Expert Testimony Admissibility in the Federal Circuit Courts, 
68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 765 (2011). 
 26. See, e.g., Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors’ Understanding of 
Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177, 200 (2006); Richard A. Wise et al., What 
U.S. Law Enforcement Officers Know and Believe About Eyewitness Factors, Eyewitness Interviews 
and Identification Procedures, 25 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 488, 497 (2011); Richard A. Wise 
et al., What U.S. Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys Know and Believe About Eyewitness Testimony, 
23 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1266, 1277–78 (2009). 
 27. State v. Cheatam, 81 P.3d 830 (Wash. 2003). 
 28. State v. Allen, 294 P.3d 679 (Wash. 2013). 
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State v. Allen, Washington trial courts have broad discretion to permit 
jury instruction on cross-racial misidentification, while the discretion to 
refuse such an instruction is relatively narrow. Part VI argues that Wash-
ington trial courts should exercise their discretion liberally to permit ex-
pert testimony and jury instruction on cross-racial misidentification 
whenever relevant, which should be supplemented with the development 
of a publicly available pool of qualified experts and the formal adoption 
of pattern instructions. Part VII advocates for broader education and re-
form surrounding these issues. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF CROSS-RACIAL MISIDENTIFICATION 
Many criminal prosecutions are based, at least in part, on eyewit-
ness identification.29 Such identification occurs whenever a witness testi-
fies that he or she saw the defendant committing the alleged crime or 
engaging in relevant conduct suggestive of guilt. In many prosecutions, 
eyewitness identification represents the primary or only evidence of 
guilt.30 Historically, our criminal justice system has placed great value on 
such evidence.31 
Today, however, there is overwhelming evidence that eyewitness 
identification is erroneous approximately one-third of the time32 and is 
                                                 
 29. See, e.g., Heather D. Flowe et al., The Role of Eyewitness Identification Evidence in Felony 
Case Dispositions, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 140, 150 (2011) (finding that among a random 
sampling of assault, rape, and robbery cases in one of the largest district attorney’s offices in the 
United States, “one out of every three suspects had positive [eyewitness identification] evidence in 
their case”). 
 30. See id. (finding that 11% of prosecuted assault, rape, and robbery cases were based on 
eyewitness identification alone or eyewitness identification with only limited corroborating evi-
dence). The authors believe that the rate of cases based solely on eyewitness identification is much 
higher for misdemeanors, due to the lesser resources devoted to investigating those crimes and for 
other such reasons. 
 31. See, e.g., Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]here 
is almost nothing more convincing [to a jury] than a live human being who takes the stand, points a 
finger at the defendant, and says ‘That’s the one!’” (internal quotations omitted)); State v. Wheeler, 
737 P.2d 1005, 1006, 1010 (Wash. 1987) (holding that eyewitness identification of suspect who had 
been found nearby wearing shirt matching witness’s original description constituted “overwhelming 
evidence” of guilt); cf. Numbers 35:30 (New Oxford Annotated, 3d ed.) (“If anyone kills another, the 
murderer shall be put to death on the evidence of witnesses; but no one shall be put to death on the 
testimony of a single witness.”). 
 32. See Brief for Am. Psychological Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14–17, 
Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012) (No. 10-8974) (explaining that “researchers have 
conducted a variety of studies of actual witness identifications . . . [that] have consistently found that 
the rate of inaccurate identifications is roughly 33 percent”); see also, e.g., Bruce W. Behrman & 
Sherrie L. Davey, Eyewitness Identification in Actual Criminal Cases: An Archival Analysis, 25 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 475, 482 (2001) (study of actual lineups finding that eyewitnesses identified 
suspects 50% of the time and mistakenly identified lineup “foils”—unrelated individuals inserted 
into the lineups—24% of the time). The risk of misidentification may increase when similar-looking 
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far less accurate than most jurors believe it to be.33 In fact, in many cases 
a suspect need not bear any resemblance to the real perpetrator for an 
eyewitness to falsely identify the suspect.34 Further, eyewitness confi-
dence is malleable and provides no guarantee of accuracy.35 A recent 
report from a committee of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 
reviewed the state of eyewitness science, acknowledged the strong foun-
dation of basic research on the fallibility of memory and visual percep-
                                                                                                             
clothing is involved. In one recent study, subjects who interacted with one experimenter and were 
shortly thereafter shown a picture of a similar-looking individual wearing similar (but not identical) 
clothing falsely identified the person in the photograph as the experimenter 50% of the time. See 
Jennifer E. Dysart et al., Show-ups: The Critical Issue of Clothing Bias, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOL. 1009, 1017–19 (2006). 
 33. See ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 9 (1979) (“Jurors have been known 
to accept eyewitness testimony pointing to guilt even when it is far outweighed by evidence of inno-
cence.”); Tanja Rapus Benton et al., Eyewitness Memory Is Still Not Common Sense: Comparing 
Jurors, Judges and Law Enforcement to Eyewitness Experts, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 115, 
125 (2006) (“Jurors were in agreement with the experts on only 13% of the eyewitness issues sur-
veyed.”); Saul M. Kassin & Kimberly A. Barndollar, The Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony: A 
Comparison of Experts and Prospective Jurors, 22 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1241, 1245 (1992) (survey 
demonstrating lack of juror knowledge on findings of eyewitness science); Michael R. Leippe et al., 
Timing of Eyewitness Expert Testimony, Jurors’ Need for Cognition, and Case Strength as Determi-
nants of Trial Verdicts, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 524, 524 (2004) (discussing literature and noting 
“there is evidence that jurors tend to overbelieve eyewitnesses, have insufficient understanding of 
the factors that affect memory, and are overly swayed by eyewitness confidence, which is not very 
diagnostic of accuracy and apt to be inflated by the time the eyewitness reaches the courtroom” 
(citations omitted)); Daniel J. Simons & Christopher F. Chabris, What People Believe About How 
Memory Works: A Representative Survey of the U.S. Population, 6 PLOS ONE e22757, at 3 (2011) 
(national survey finding that most respondents believed visual memory works like accurate video-
camera recording). 
 34. See, e.g., Roy S. Malpass et al., The Need for Expert Psychological Testimony on Eyewit-
ness Identification, in EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
3–4 (Brian L. Cutler ed., 2009) (noting that an early review of known misidentifications found that 
in many cases “the wrongfully accused person and the really guilty criminal bore not the slightest 
resemblance to each other, whereas in [many] other cases, the resemblance, while fair, was still not 
at all close” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 35. See, e.g., Kathy Pezdek, Content, Form, and Ethical Issues Concerning Psychological 
Testimony on Eyewitness Identification, in EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 31–32 (Brian L. Cutler ed., 2009) (“[One study] reported a [.41] accu-
racy–confidence [correlation] when . . . limited . . . to individuals who chose to make an identifica-
tion. . . . How can an eyewitness expert help a jury understand what a .41 correlation means? . . . [I]f 
we assume that eyewitnesses make accurate identifications about 50% of the time, encountering a 
highly confident mistaken identification would be about as common as encountering a tall female or 
a short male. . . . It is also important to recognize that witness confidence is malleable.”). Numerous 
stories have been documented in which the testimony of a very confident but mistaken eyewitness 
resulted in the conviction and imprisonment of an innocent person. See, e.g., Jennifer Thompson, 
Op-Ed., I Was Certain, but I Was Wrong, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2000/06/18/opinion/i-was-certain-but-i-was-wrong.html (story of victim who “studied every single 
detail on [her] rapist’s face” but then misidentified an innocent suspect who spent over a decade in 
prison until DNA evidence proved his innocence). 
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tion, and recognized the need for reforms in this area.36 The NAS report 
identifies the need for much additional research to understand the com-
plex interaction of factors that may influence the accuracy of any given 
eyewitness identification, finds that some prior research on particular 
variables (such as the presence of a weapon or the procedures used for 
subsequent identification) has lacked sufficient rigor and transparency, 
and calls for better research designs and collaboration among scientists 
and law enforcement personnel.37 In the meantime, the report recognizes 
that the problem of eyewitness misidentification is well established, on-
going, and demands action.38 
The scope and significance of the problem is substantial. Eyewit-
ness misidentification has been found to be the most common cause of 
wrongful convictions,39 playing a role in approximately 75% of the nu-
merous convictions overturned by post-conviction DNA testing nation-
wide.40 Although measuring wrongful conviction rates is notoriously dif-
ficult, one recent qualitative analysis estimated that the wrongful convic-
tion rate for felonies in the United States is somewhere between 0.5%–
1%.41 This would represent approximately 5,000–10,000 wrongful felony 
convictions each year,42 with a substantial portion likely involving eye-
witness misidentification,43 and few ever resulting in exoneration.44 Oth-
                                                 
 36. See COMM. ON SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING AND MAXIMIZING THE 
VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE 
COURTS ET AL., NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT: ASSESSING 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION xiii, 2, 31–48 (2014) [hereinafter NAS REPORT]. 
 37. See id. at xiii, 2–3, 49–72. 
 38. See id. at 71–81. 
 39. See, e.g., Devenport et al., supra note 15, at 51 (“For several decades now, scholars and 
social scientists have studied miscarriages of justice occurring in the American legal system and 
have drawn the same conclusion: Mistaken eyewitness identifications is the leading cause of wrong-
ful convictions.” (citations omitted)). 
 40. See Eyewitness Misidentification, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Nov. 18, 
2014); see also State v. Riofta, 209 P.3d 467, 474 (Wash. 2009) (“Riofta and amicus correctly argue 
that mistaken eyewitness identification is a leading cause of wrongful conviction.”); BRANDON L. 
GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 48 (2011) 
(reporting that 190 of the first 250 DNA-based exonerations in the United States involved eyewit-
ness misidentification). 
 41. Marvin Zalman, Qualitatively Estimating the Incidence of Wrongful Convictions, 48 CRIM. 
L. BULL. 221, 230 (2012). 
 42. See id. at 225–26.  
 43. See, e.g., Flowe et al., supra note 29, at 150 (sampling of felony cases finding that “one out 
of every three suspects had [an eyewitness identification] in their case,” which increased the likeli-
hood of prosecution); Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 542 (2005) (“The most common cause of wrongful convictions 
is eyewitness misidentification. This is not news.”). 
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er experts have suggested that up to 6% of incarcerated persons in the 
United States are innocent, which would translate to approximately 
140,000 wrongfully imprisoned inmates at present.45 
The costs of wrongful convictions are numerous and devastating. 
Innocent persons who are wrongly convicted are deprived of their liber-
ty; burdened with substantial personal debt; suffer emotional, psycholog-
ical, and physical harm; face stigmatization, lack of support, and difficul-
ty finding employment upon release; and must overcome substantial le-
gal and administrative hurdles to obtain any sort of financial compensa-
tion.46 In the meantime, the actual perpetrators who escape conviction 
often proceed to commit additional crimes and harm more victims.47 
Wrongful convictions also seriously undermine public confidence in the 
administration of justice48 and inflict hundreds of millions of dollars in 
financial costs on the public.49 
Eyewitness misidentification represents a serious problem within 
the criminal justice system that should be addressed, but it is important 
not to overstate the unreliability of eyewitness identification as an entire 
category of evidence. Not all such identifications are mistaken—
according to estimates, approximately two-thirds are correct.50 Further, 
the reliability of such evidence may depend on the circumstances. For 
example, research and exonerations implicating mistaken identification 
tend to involve identifications of strangers (e.g., a victim identifying an 
unknown attacker in a lineup, or a third party identifying an unknown 
perpetrator from a photo array), and may be less relevant to cases in 
                                                                                                             
 44. See Gross et al., supra note 43, at 523–24 (study finding 340 identifiable exonerations in 
the United States between 1989 and 2003). 
 45. See Smith & Hattery, supra note 16, at 76; cf. D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: 
An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 
761–62 (2007) (reviewing data on capital rape-murders and resulting exonerations and concluding 
that the rate of wrongful convictions for such cases is probably somewhere between 3.3% and 5%). 
 46. See Daniel S. Kahn, Presumed Guilty Until Proven Innocent: The Burden of Proof in 
Wrongful Conviction Claims Under State Compensation Statutes, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 123, 
129–31, 136 (2010) (discussing harms). 
 47. See James R. Acker, The Flipside Injustice of Wrongful Convictions: When the Guilty Go 
Free, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1629, 1632 & n.16 (2013) (discussing research); see also John Conroy & Rob 
Warden, The High Costs of Wrongful Convictions, BETTER GOV’T ASS’N (June 18, 2011), 
http://www.bettergov.org/investigations/wrongful_convictions_1.aspx (study of wrongful convic-
tions in Illinois from 1989 to 2010 finding that “while 85 people were wrongfully incarcerated, the 
actual perpetrators were on a collective crime spree that included 14 murders, 11 sexual assaults, 10 
kidnappings and at least 62 other felonies”). 
 48. See Acker, supra note 47, at 1705 & nn.782–83. 
 49. See Conroy & Warden, supra note 47 (study of wrongful convictions in Illinois from 1989 
to 2010 concluding that the known wrongful convictions during that time “cost taxpayers $214 mil-
lion”). 
 50. See supra note 32. 
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which an eyewitness recognizes and identifies someone familiar.51 Not-
withstanding such distinctions, the evidence is clear that eyewitness iden-
tifications are mistaken in a substantial portion of actual criminal cases,52 
and that such misidentifications result in wrongful convictions.53 
Although the shortcomings of eyewitness identification have been 
confirmed, jurors continue to overestimate this evidence’s accuracy.54 In 
a recent national survey, most respondents agreed with the notion that 
human memory “works like a video camera, accurately recording the 
events we see . . . so that we can review and inspect them later.”55 Yet 
“decades of research” has demonstrated that memory is often incomplete 
and inaccurate; depends on the subject’s “goals and expectations”; is re-
trieved in “a constructive process influenced by knowledge, beliefs, ex-
pectations, and schemas”; and can easily be mistaken.56 Despite this, 
many jurors find eyewitness testimony so persuasive that it colors their 
view of all other evidence in the case.57 This may be due in part to the 
fact that mistaken eyewitnesses generally believe they are telling the 
truth; as a result, their testimony will seem sincere and often will be im-
pervious to cross-examination.58 
Even more troublesome than eyewitness misidentification in gen-
eral is cross-racial eyewitness misidentification. That is because eyewit-
nesses who are identifying someone of a race other than their own tend 
                                                 
 51. See State v. Riofta, 206 P.3d 467, 474 (Wash. 2009) (“[M]istaken eyewitness identification 
is a leading cause of wrongful conviction. However, this is not a case where the defendant was un-
known to the victim. Riofta and the victim lived in the same neighborhood and had known each 
other for years.” (citation omitted)); State v. Guloy, 705 P.2d 1182, 1193 (Wash. 1985) (“Dr. Loftus’ 
[proposed expert] testimony would not have affected the reliability of Domingo’s statement because 
her testimony [on eyewitness misidentification] only concerns the identification of strangers.”); cf. 
State v. Welchel, 801 P.2d 948, 949–50 (Wash. 1990) (eyewitness was girlfriend of defendant and 
participated in crime); State v. Pam, 635 P.2d 766, 769 (Wash. 1981) (eyewitness recognized de-
fendant “because they had been incarcerated in the King County jail at the same time”). 
 52. See supra note 32. 
 53. See sources cited supra notes 39–40. 
 54. See supra note 33; see also Michael R. Leippe & Donna Eisenstadt, The Influence of Eye-
witness Expert Testimony on Jurors’ Beliefs and Judgments, in EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 170–72 (Brian L. Cutler ed., 2009). 
 55. Simons & Chabris, supra note 33, at 3. 
 56. Id. at 5. 
 57. See Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 & nn. 4–5 (1981) (noting that “statistical and 
psychological evidence . . . persuasively supports [the] conclusion that eyewitness identification 
evidence is overwhelmingly influential” and that jurors tend to accept identifications “by well in-
tended uninterested persons . . . as absolute proof” (internal marks omitted)); Timothy P. O’Toole & 
Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited: Towards a New Rule of Decision for Due Process 
Challenges to Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 109, 134–35 (2006) (citing 
studies). 
 58. See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 
CORNELL L. REV. 934, 952–955 (1984); O’Toole & Shay, supra note 57, at 135. 
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to be especially unreliable.59 One well-known meta-analysis covering 
over thirty years of eyewitness studies concluded that eyewitnesses are 
56% more likely to falsely identify an individual if the individual is of 
another race.60 As recognized in the NAS report, this and other research 
has established the cross-race effect as a “generally accepted” phenome-
non.61 In addition, cross-racial identification is relied upon in a substan-
tial number of prosecutions. For example, a recent study of assault, rape, 
and robbery cases from one of the largest District Attorney’s Offices in 
the United States found that cross-racial identifications were involved in 
at least 30% of such cases.62 In Washington alone, at least nine appellate 
decisions since 2010 have involved prosecutions based at least in part on 
a cross-racial identification.63 Consistent with the research findings and 
prevalence of this type of evidence, approximately one-third of wrongful 
convictions uncovered by DNA analysis have involved whites misidenti-
fying blacks,64 representing a substantial portion of wrongful convictions 
in general and of cases involving eyewitness misidentification in particu-
lar.65 
As with eyewitness misidentification in general, research shows 
that most jurors are either misinformed about, or unaware of, the distinct 
inaccuracy of cross-racial identification in particular.66 Researchers have 
found “large discrepancies” between juror and expert knowledge regard-
                                                 
 59. See State v. Cheatam, 81 P.3d 830, 840 (Wash. 2003) (“[T]here are numerous studies 
showing that contrary to many jurors’ beliefs upon questioning, it is more difficult for people of one 
race to identify people of a different race.”); Saul M. Kassin et al., On the “General Acceptance” of 
Eyewitness Testimony Research: A New Survey of the Experts, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 405, 407–08, 
410 (2001); Meissner & Brigham, supra note 17; Kathy Pezdek et al., Cross-Race (but Not Same-
Race) Face Identification Is Impaired by Presenting Faces in a Group Rather Than Individually, 36 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 488, 488–89 (2012) (reviewing literature on cross-race effect). 
 60. See Meissner & Brigham, supra note 17, at 15. 
 61. NAS REPORT, supra note 36, at 66–67. 
 62. Flowe et al., supra note 29, at 144–146, 149. 
 63. See In re Gentry, 316 P.3d 1020, 1033 n.13 (Wash. 2014); State v. Allen, 294 P.3d 679 
(Wash. 2013); State v. Jaime, 233 P.3d 554, 560 (Wash. 2010) (Sanders, J., concurring); State v. 
Fields, No. 70036-7-I, 2014 WL 3741925, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. July 28, 2014); State v. Pulega, No. 
69439-1-I, 2014 WL 448586, at *7 n.2 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2014); State v. Ross, No. 66849-8-I, 
2012 WL 3065304, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. July 30, 2012); State v. Ljubich, No. 66095-1, 2012 WL 
1382440, at *7 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2012); State v. Seals, No. 63883-1-I, 2011 WL 1226896, at 
*2 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2011); State v. Hassan, No. 63556-5-I, 2010 WL 4409691, at *7 (Wash. 
Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2010). 
 64. James M. Doyle, Discounting the Error Costs, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 253, 253 
(2001); see also Smith & Hattery, supra note 16, at 84 (“[T]he vast majority of exoneration cases 
involve a White victim who mis-identifies an African American man.”). 
 65. See GARRETT, supra note 40, at 48 (reporting that approximately 75% of DNA-based ex-
onerations in the United States involved eyewitness misidentification). 
 66. See, e.g., Benton et al., supra note 33, at 119–20; Kassin & Barndollar, supra note 33, at 
1245; Schmechel et al., supra note 26, at 200. 
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ing the reliability of cross-racial identification.67 In one recent survey of 
potential jurors, for example, researchers found that “almost two-thirds 
of jurors surveyed” were “ill-informed about the inaccuracy of cross-
racial identification,” and some jurors believed that cross-racial identifi-
cation is more accurate rather than less accurate.68 
Historically, courts regularly overlooked the problem of eyewitness 
misidentification and resisted any efforts to prevent undue reliance on 
eyewitness testimony at trial, especially attempts to present expert testi-
mony on the subject.69 In the 1970s and 1980s, Washington State trial 
courts regularly excluded expert testimony on eyewitness misidentifica-
tion, and those decisions were regularly upheld on appeal.70 These courts 
gave various reasons for exclusion, including assertions that eyewitness 
science was unfounded, speculative, or conflicting;71 that the general 
findings of eyewitness science would not be relevant to a specific identi-
fication in a particular case;72 that the reliability of an eyewitness identi-
fication was a matter of common knowledge and should be left to the 
jury;73 and that cross-examination rather than expert testimony could be 
                                                 
 67. Benton et al., supra note 33, at 119–20 (finding “large discrepancies” between juror and 
expert knowledge regarding the reliability of cross-racial identification). 
 68. Schmechel et al., supra note 26, at 200 (reporting that 48% of survey respondents “thought 
cross-race and same-race identifications are of equal reliability” whereas 11% “either did not know 
or thought a cross-racial identification would be more reliable”). 
 69. See, e.g., Jules Epstein, Expert Testimony: Legal Standards for Admissibility, in EXPERT 
TESTIMONY ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 69 (Brian L. Cutler ed., 2009) 
(“Historically . . . courts were adverse to expert testimony regarding eyewitness[es].”); Malpass et 
al., supra note 34, at 3–4 (noting that researcher in the 1930s who discovered that misidentifications 
were causing wrongful convictions “made a series of recommendations, which had little detectable 
impact on the legal system”). 
 70. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 743 P.2d 290, 294 (Wash. 1987); State v. Mak, 718 P.2d 407, 
422 (Wash. 1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hill, 870 P.2d 313, 315 (Wash. 1994); 
State v. Barry, 611 P.2d 1262, 1267 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Brown, 564 P.2d 342, 346–47 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1977); but see State v. Cook 639 P.2d 863, 869 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (trial court 
allowed expert to testify on findings of eyewitness science in general but still did not allow expert to 
“answer hypothetical questions and address specific problems”). 
 71. See Brown, 564 P.2d at 346 (“[A] professor of psychology . . . was called by the defendant 
as an expert witness to testify concerning her studies, conclusions and opinions as to eyewitness 
testimony generally, and as to the eyewitness identifications in this case particularly. . . . The trial 
court . . . ruled that the offered opinions were highly speculative and founded on assumptions contra-
ry to any evidence in the case.”); Johnson, 743 P.2d at 293–94 (“[T]he court excluded [some eye-
witness expert] testimony . . . because, in the court’s view, that testimony . . . was based on studies 
which had reached contradictory conclusions.”). 
 72. See Barry, 611 P.2d at 1267 (“We are in agreement with the ruling of the trial court that the 
proposed testimony of [the eyewitness expert] would have been collateral to the specific issue of Mr. 
Culpepper’s ability accurately to observe and recall what he saw . . . . The proffered testimony bore 
no specific relation to Mr. Culpepper but concerned eyewitnesses in general.”). 
 73. See Mak, 718 P.2d at 422 (“The trial court did not err by declining to admit the testimony 
on eyewitness identification. . . . [T]he trial court appropriately observed that the ‘subject of the 
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used to call into question the reliability of any given identification.74 For 
these asserted reasons, Washington courts generally reserved expert tes-
timony on eyewitness misidentification to “a very narrow range of cas-
es,”75 namely those that would “‘cry out’ for an explanation” due to in-
consistent physical evidence or otherwise.76 The problem, of course, was 
that these courts did not understand eyewitness science (which remained 
in its infancy) and were unaware of the nature and prevalence of eyewit-
ness misidentifications and the need for corrective measures. 
More recently, however, courts have begun to recognize the need to 
address eyewitness misidentification, including cross-racial misidentifi-
cation, within our criminal justice system. The New Jersey Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in State v. Henderson77 and the Oregon Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in State v. Lawson78 are two prime examples. In 
each case, the court acknowledged that memory is malleable and that an 
array of variables, including cross-race bias, can affect and dilute 
memory and lead to misidentifications.79 These two courts adopted vari-
ous trial procedures intended to address the overarching problem of eye-
witness misidentification, including heightened requirements for the ad-
mission of eyewitness identifications and enhanced jury instructions.80 
Washington courts also have now recognized that eyewitness misidenti-
fications, and especially cross-racial misidentifications, are an ongoing 
                                                                                                             
testimony is within the general knowledge and experience of a lay jury’ . . . .”); Johnson, 743 P.2d at 
294 (“The court excluded the . . . proposed testimony [on eyewitness misidentification], . . . finding 
that it would not be helpful to the trier of fact because it was within the ‘common experience’ of the 
jurors. . . . [E]xcluding expert testimony on eyewitness identification for the reason that it would not 
be helpful to the trier of fact is a proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion in the great majority of 
cases.” (internal quotations omitted)); Barry, 611 P.2d at 1267 (“The proffered testimony . . . . posed 
the risk of interfering with the jury’s role as factfinder . . . .”). 
 74. See Mak, 718 P.2d at 422 (“[T]he trial court appropriately observed that . . . cross examina-
tion of the eyewitness would reveal any inconsistencies.”); Barry, 611 P.2d at 1267 (“Although the 
possibility of misidentification always exists in a given case, exposure of that risk is a specific func-
tion of cross-examination and argument by defense counsel.”). 
 75. State v. Moon, 726 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986), abrogated by State v. 
Cheatam, 81 P.3d 830, 842 (Wash. 2003). 
 76. Johnson, 743 P.2d at 294 (citing Moon, 726 P.2d at 1267). After the Moon decision, nu-
merous appellate decisions in Washington addressed the admission of eyewitness expert testimony 
with the understanding that such testimony is required only in a very narrow class of cases, based on 
a three-part test the Moon court identified. See, e.g., id. Because the Washington State Supreme 
Court in Cheatam expressly disapproved of Moon’s overly restrictive approach, these decisions are 
no longer good law. See Cheatam, 81 P.3d at 842. 
 77. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011). 
 78. State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012). 
 79. See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 917; Lawson, 291 P.3d at 687–88. 
 80. See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 878; Lawson, 291 P.3d at 690–97. 
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problem within our criminal justice system.81 It remains an open ques-
tion, however, how best to address the problem. 
III. THE USE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY AND JURY INSTRUCTION TO 
PREVENT WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
The “central purpose of any system of criminal justice is to convict 
the guilty and free the innocent.”82 A wrongful conviction is directly con-
trary to this purpose, both because the truly guilty party often escapes 
conviction as a result, and because great harm is wrongly imposed on an 
innocent person. Our criminal justice system is thus founded on a strong 
presumption of innocence and includes numerous additional procedural 
safeguards to promote accuracy and prevent wrongful convictions.83 
As discussed above, cross-racial misidentification increases the 
number of wrongful convictions, the number of guilty persons who es-
cape conviction, and the extent of racial disparity in our criminal justice 
system. Thus, cross-racial misidentification poses an ongoing threat to 
the integrity of the criminal justice system and demands action.84 At the 
outset, there are numerous potential ways to try addressing this problem. 
But in considering remedies, one must also keep in mind the potential 
tradeoff between overall rates of wrongful convictions and correct con-
victions for crimes committed. Entirely prohibiting criminal prosecutions 
would guarantee zero wrongful convictions, for example, but at the same 
time would result in zero correct convictions—an unacceptable tradeoff. 
In general, it is a “fundamental value determination of our society” 
that “it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man 
go free.”85 This means that preventing a wrongful conviction is more im-
                                                 
 81. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 294 P.3d 679, 682 (Wash. 2013) (C. Johnson, J., lead opinion) 
(“Concerns and discussions over the reliability of eyewitness identifications, and more specifically 
cross-racial eyewitness identifications, have arisen in cases for some time.”); id. at 691 (Chambers, 
J., concurring) (acknowledging “the demonstrated weakness of eye witness testimony in general and 
cross-racial witness identification in particular”); Cheatam, 81 P.3d at 840 (acknowledging that 
“courts were once extremely reluctant to admit [expert] testimony [on eyewitness misidentification]” 
but that a “shift in thinking” has taken place as a result of “numerous studies” and research); State v. 
Allen, 255 P.3d 784, 787 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (“Mistaken eyewitness identification is a leading 
cause of wrongful conviction. . . . Studies have shown that a cross-racial identification . . . is an 
especially problematic identification.”), aff’d on other grounds, 294 P.3d 679 (Wash. 2013). 
 82. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398 (1993); see also Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 
862 (1975) (noting that the “ultimate objective” of our criminal justice system is “that the guilty be 
convicted and the innocent go free”). 
 83. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 398–99. 
 84. See supra Part II. 
 85. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 
(1970)) (internal quotations omitted). This value determination is often reflected in statements made 
concerning the appropriate ratio between guilty persons who escape conviction and innocent persons 
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portant than securing a correct conviction, all else being equal. At the 
same time, securing correct convictions remains an important goal to be 
pursued. The preference for preventing wrongful convictions thus has 
limits. And for that reason, an extreme remedy such as a blanket prohibi-
tion against using eyewitness identifications as evidence would be unac-
ceptable; it would exclude even the most reliable of identifications (such 
as the identification of a spouse in a typical domestic violence incident), 
even for the limited purpose of corroboration. Proper solutions to the 
problem of cross-racial misidentification will balance the need to prevent 
wrongful convictions with the need to convict guilty parties. And the best 
solutions will reduce or eliminate wrongful convictions resulting from 
misidentification without compromising the effectiveness of the system 
in accurately identifying and convicting the guilty. 
Two potential remedies that have been suggested for addressing 
cross-racial misidentification are the use of expert testimony and jury 
instructions at trial.86 As will be discussed in Part VI, there are numerous 
additional remedies that should be considered, including general educa-
tion of jurors, judges, attorneys, and police; changes to relevant eviden-
tiary standards; and improved investigatory standards.87 Notwithstanding 
these additional remedies, which are not mutually exclusive, there are 
numerous reasons to focus on the use of expert testimony and jury in-
structions in particular. First, expert testimony and jury instructions on 
cross-racial misidentification are already authorized under Washington 
law,88 have already been used in criminal trials in Washington,89 and can 
be employed immediately on a widespread basis. Second, there are exist-
ing efforts at developing these two remedies in Washington, including 
                                                                                                             
who are wrongly convicted, sometimes referred to as the “Blackstone Ratio.” E.g., Steven E. Clark, 
Blackstone and the Balance of Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1105, 1105 
(2010) (“‘[T]he law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suf-
fer.’” (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 358)); see also Schlup, 513 U.S. at 325 
(“‘The maxim of the law is . . . that it is better that ninety-nine . . . offenders should escape, than that 
one innocent man should be condemned.’” (quoting THOMAS STARKIE, EVIDENCE 756 (1824))). 
 86. See, e.g., Allen, 294 P.3d at 691 (Chambers, J., concurring) (“Given the demonstrated 
weakness of eye witness testimony in general and cross-racial eye witness identification in particu-
lar, in my view, expert testimony and instruction to the jury on the weakness of cross-racial identifi-
cations should be the standard in our courtrooms whenever it would be helpful.”). 
 87. See infra Part VII. 
 88. See infra Parts IV, V. 
 89. E.g., State v. Ljubich, No. 66095-1, 2012 WL 1382440, at *7 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 
2012) (noting that at trial “[a] defense expert testified on the topic of ‘cross-racial identification’”); 
State v. Bell, 788 P.2d 1109, 1112 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (“Dr. Croyle was allowed to testify re-
garding . . . cross racial identification.”); State v. Cook, 639 P.2d 863, 869 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) 
(“During trial, the court allowed . . . an expert on eyewitness identification[] to testify generally as to 
the factors affecting the reliability of such identifications.”). 
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research aimed at the development of a model jury instruction.90 Third, 
there is a great deal of research on the use and effectiveness of these two 
remedies.91 Fourth, the widespread use of these two remedies could help 
increase general awareness of the problem, providing needed support for 
broader efforts and additional remedies. 
To evaluate the merit of promoting expert testimony and jury in-
struction on cross-racial misidentification, one must first consider the 
potential effects these tools may have on the trial process and on ver-
dicts. Notwithstanding good intentions and theory, if these tools have no 
actual effect on outcomes, then using them will do little to solve the un-
derlying problems associated with cross-racial misidentification. And if 
these tools somehow have substantial negative effects on the proper 
functioning of the trial process, their use might then be undesirable not-
withstanding some lesser positive effects. 
In general, researchers have found “mixed effects” from expert tes-
timony and jury instruction on eyewitness misidentification, depending 
on the particular study and the particular form of testimony or instruction 
tested.92 Researchers have grouped these observed effects into three main 
categories: sensitivity, skepticism, and no-effect/confusion.93 First, in 
some studies mock jurors have demonstrated increased sensitivity to the 
particular factors found to render eyewitness identifications more or less 
reliable, such as the lighting at the scene, duration of witness exposure, 
the presence of a weapon, or whether the identification is cross-racial.94 
These jurors proved capable of distinguishing between more and less 
                                                 
 90. See infra Part VI. 
 91. See infra notes 92–97 and accompanying text. 
 92. Kristy A. Martire & Richard I. Kemp, The Impact of Eyewitness Expert Evidence and 
Judicial Instruction on Juror Ability to Evaluate Eyewitness Testimony, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
225, 225–26 (2009) [hereinafter The Impact of Eyewitness Expert Evidence]; see also, e.g., Kathy 
Pezdek et al., Does Trial Presentation Medium Matter in Jury Simulation Research? Evaluating the 
Effectiveness of Eyewitness Expert Testimony, 24 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 673, 674 (2010) 
(noting that “the findings are mixed”). 
 93. See, e.g., Brian L. Cutler et al., The Eyewitness, the Expert Psychologist, and the Jury, 13 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 311, 312–14 (1989); Jennifer L. Devenport & Brian L. Cutler, Impact of De-
fense-Only and Opposing Eyewitness Experts on Juror Judgments, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 569, 
570 (2004) [hereinafter Impact of Defense-Only and Eyewitness Expert Evidence]; Kristy A. Martire 
& Richard I. Kemp, Can Experts Help Jurors to Evaluate Eyewitness Evidence? A Review of Eye-
witness Expert Effects, 16 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 24, 25 (2011) [hereinafter Can 
Experts Help Jurors]; Martire & Kemp, The Impact of Eyewitness Expert Evidence, supra note 92, at 
225. 
 94. See Cutler et al., supra note 93, at 329 (stating that use of expert testimony increases sensi-
tivity of jurors); Devenport & Cutler, Impact of Defense-Only and Opposing Eyewitness Experts, 
supra note 93, at 570 (discussing studies); Martire & Kemp, Can Experts Help Jurors, supra note 
93, at 29–33 (same); Martire & Kemp, The Impact of Eyewitness Expert Evidence, supra note 92, at 
225–26 (same). 
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reliable eyewitness evidence based on the presence of such relevant fac-
tors.95 Second, in many other studies mock jurors have demonstrated 
general skepticism—an overall reduction in the weight given to eyewit-
ness evidence regardless of the particular factors involved.96 And third, 
in a small number of studies mock jurors have demonstrated no effect 
resulting from expert testimony or jury instruction, because the testimony 
or instruction was too confusing or for some other reason.97 
Notwithstanding the mixed effects discussed above, the research re-
sults to date support the use of expert testimony and jury instruction to 
help solve the cross-racial misidentification problem, for numerous rea-
sons. First, the research shows that jurors can be effectively sensitized to 
cross-racial bias and other such factors, and that sensitized jurors will 
give more appropriate weight to relevant identification evidence.98 This 
is consistent with the general legal presumption that jurors are reasonably 
intelligent and will understand the evidence and implement the trial 
judge’s reasonable instructions.99 It is also consistent with the conclu-
sions of the recent NAS report, which recommends the use of expert tes-
timony and “clear and concise” jury instructions to educate jurors on the-
se issues.100 
Second, to the extent juror skepticism results, jurors will be moti-
vated to rely on other forms of evidence that are more reliable, and will 
be less likely to give undue weight to eyewitness evidence.101 In light of 
                                                 
 95. See Cutler et al., supra note 93, at 327; Martire & Kemp, Can Experts Help Jurors, supra 
note 93, at 29–31; Martire & Kemp, The Impact of Eyewitness Expert Evidence, supra note 92, at 
225–26. 
 96. See Leippe et al., supra note 33, at 527 (discussing studies); Martire & Kemp, Can Experts 
Help Jurors, supra note 93, at 29–33 (same); Martire & Kemp, The Impact of Eyewitness Expert 
Evidence, supra note 92, at 226 (same). 
 97. See Devenport & Cutler, Impact of Defense-Only and Opposing Eyewitness Experts, supra 
note 93, at 574–75 (finding no effect on mock jurors from expert testimony); Martire & Kemp, Can 
Experts Help Jurors, supra note 93, at 29–33 (discussing studies); Martire & Kemp, The Impact of 
Eyewitness Expert Evidence, supra note 92, at 226 (same). 
 98. See sources cited supra notes 94–95. 
 99. See State v. Montgomery, 183 P.3d 267, 281 (Wash. 2008) (J.M. Johnson, J., concurring) 
(“Jurors are presumed to be intelligent, capable of understanding instructions and applying them to 
the facts of the case.” (quoting People v. Carey, 158 P.3 743, 758 (Cal. 2007) (internal quotations 
omitted)); State v. Whetstone, 191 P.2d 818, 840 (Wash. 1948) (“We must and do assume, in sup-
port of our jury system, that jurors are men and women of reasonable intelligence; [and] that it is 
their desire to return verdicts supported by evidence and according to the court’s instructions . . . .”); 
see also City of Seattle v. Gellein, 768 P.2d 470, 471 (Wash. 1989) (concluding that the effect of a 
jury instruction “[was] to be judged by the understanding of a reasonable juror”); State v. Dana, 439 
P.2d 403, 405 (Wash. 1968) (“If instructions are such as are readily understood and not misleading 
to the ordinary mind, they are sufficient.”). 
 100. NAS REPORT, supra note 36, at 112. 
 101. See sources cited supra note 96. 
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the presumption of innocence and the relative importance of avoiding 
wrongful convictions, juror skepticism is at least preferable to the status 
quo (acute over-acceptance of eyewitness testimony102), even if skeptical 
jurors are not able to discern which particular factors increase or de-
crease reliability, and even if eyewitness evidence is the primary or only 
evidence of guilt. The effect of juror skepticism should not be overstat-
ed—it simply represents a relative reduction in weight given to eyewit-
ness identification, not a refusal to fairly consider all evidence in a given 
case.103 Prosecutors will remain able to explain any reasons why a specif-
ic identification should be considered reliable based on the particulars of 
each case.104 Moreover, expert testimony and jury instruction will be al-
lowed only when relevant,105 meaning that some amount of skepticism 
probably will be appropriate regardless of which particular factors are at 
play in the case. 
Third, although expert testimony and jury instruction might some-
times have no effect on jurors, this result is relatively rare in experiments 
and is thus relatively unlikely in practice.106 In any case, a lack of any 
effect does not worsen outcomes, other than a potential increase in ad-
ministrative costs. 
Fourth, to the extent that expert testimony and jury instruction on 
cross-racial misidentification become common practice, additional ef-
forts can be put toward research and refinement.107 Practitioners and 
                                                 
 102. See sources cited supra notes 33, 54, 57–58. 
 103. See, e.g., Martire & Kemp, Can Experts Help Jurors, supra note 93, at 29 (noting that 
skepticism can be reflected in greater “scrutiny” of eyewitness testimony, lesser “perceptions of its 
weight,” or even lesser “certainty associated with guilty verdicts”). 
 104. Prosecutors will be able to cross-examine any expert, proffer experts of their own, and 
draw all reasonable inferences from expert testimony and other evidence in the case. See, e.g., State 
v. Hoffman, 804 P.2d 577, 600 (Wash. 1991) (noting that a prosecutor “has a wide latitude in draw-
ing and expressing reasonable inferences from the evidence”); State v. Barrow, 809 P.2d 209, 212 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (approving of prosecutor’s argument “simply made . . . based on common 
sense”). 
 105. See, e.g., State v. Guloy, 705 P.2d 1182, 1193 (Wash. 1985) (eyewitness expert properly 
excluded because case did not involve the cross-racial identification of a stranger, about which the 
expert would have testified); see also infra Parts IV, V. 
 106. See, e.g., Martire & Kemp, The Impact of Eyewitness Expert Evidence, supra note 92, at 
225–26 (review of literature reflecting relatively limited number of studies showing no ef-
fect/confusion). 
 107. See, e.g., Kassin & Barndollar, supra note 33, at 1247 (noting that although some research 
on particular instructions may “suggest that the . . . instructions are not . . . effective . . . and need to 
be written in more accessible language,” that is not reason “to conclude that [jury] instruction is not 
a [generally useful] medium for educating the jury”); see also Edith Greene, Judge’s Instruction on 
Eyewitness Testimony: Evaluation and Revision, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 252, 261–62 (1988) 
(noting that jury instructions on eyewitness identification should adhere to established principles of 
psycholinguistics). 
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judges can incorporate research findings into the particular testimony and 
instructions being used, and any pattern instructions can be improved 
over time.108 
Fifth, common use of expert testimony and jury instruction on 
cross-racial misidentification in criminal cases should increase general 
awareness of this issue in the long term, among the general public and 
throughout the criminal justice system, which theoretically could in-
crease the future effectiveness of such testimony and instruction. 
Sixth, if expert testimony and jury instruction on cross-racial misi-
dentification are used effectively to prevent convictions that would oth-
erwise result, police and prosecutors presumably will be more motivated 
to focus on other forms of evidence and to ensure abundant indicia of 
reliability and corroborating evidence for any cross-racial identification 
upon which they intend to rely in court.109 Indeed, the mere recognition 
by trial courts that this category of evidence is problematic could encour-
age police and prosecutors to approach cross-racial identifications with 
greater caution. Had the police and prosecutors been more cautious in 
Michael Marshall’s case, for example, they might have tested the physi-
cal evidence collected at the scene of the crime rather than simply trust-
ing the eyewitness identification that was made. Although forensic test-
ing may be inappropriate or unnecessary in some cases due to prohibitive 
cost, cumulative evidence, or for other such reasons, eyewitness testimo-
ny generally should demand some corroborating evidence. Police who 
approach eyewitness evidence with appropriate caution are motivated not 
only to test additional evidence, but also to collect such evidence in the 
first place, conducting more thorough investigations even after an identi-
                                                 
 108. See Greene, supra note 107, at 261–70 (finding, in a study of actual Washington jurors, 
that jurors were less likely to convict in a case involving eyewitness identification when given a 
clearly worded cautionary instruction); Gabriella Ramirez et al., Judges’ Cautionary Instructions on 
Eyewitness Testimony, 14 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 31, 55 (1996) (finding that subjects who re-
ceived a clearly worded instruction on cross-racial bias were more likely to be aware of this phe-
nomenon than those who received a less clear instruction or no instruction); see also Martire & 
Kemp, The Impact of Eyewitness Expert Evidence, supra note 92, at 226 (noting that studies on one 
particular well-known jury instruction on eyewitness misidentification have found no effect from 
that particular instruction). 
 109. Cf. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 726 (2012) (noting that a “primary aim” of 
excluding unreliable identification evidence “is to deter law enforcement” from relying on such 
evidence “in the first place”); State v. Martin, 684 P.2d 651, 656 (1984) (noting that a cautionary 
instruction on testimony involving hypnosis, among other safeguards, would “substantially reduce 
the likelihood of the use of hypnosis to develop evidence” because “the police officer or prosecutor 
considering hypnotizing a potential witness [would have to] proceed with caution”); cf. Flowe et al., 
supra note 29, at 150 (finding, in a study of actual felony cases, that when a stranger provided “eye-
witness identification evidence [and there was some] limited corroborating evidence,” prosecutors 
still exercised discretion and decided not to press charges 17% of the time). 
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fication has been made. To the extent faulty cross-racial identifications 
are discredited before any charges are filed, there will no longer be any 
need for expert testimony or jury instruction on the subject. 
In sum, the regular use of expert testimony and jury instruction on 
cross-racial misidentification could prevent wrongful convictions and 
improve our criminal justice system. As the next two Parts demonstrate, 
trial courts in Washington already have wide discretion to permit the use 
of these tools in criminal trials. 
IV. DISCRETION OF WASHINGTON STATE TRIAL COURTS TO ADMIT 
EXPERT TESTIMONY ON CROSS-RACIAL MISIDENTIFICATION 
Expert testimony regarding cross-racial misidentification usually 
consists of an expert’s opinion as to the relative and overall inaccuracy of 
cross-racial eyewitness identification.110 Typically, such testimony will 
be based on scientific expertise and will indicate how research on cross-
racial misidentification can (and should) inform the jury’s evaluation of 
the eyewitness identification at issue in the case. In State v. Cheatam, the 
Washington State Supreme Court held that the admission of such testi-
mony is a discretionary decision for the trial court, reviewed under “the 
rules for admissibility of relevant evidence in general and admissibility 
of expert testimony under ER 702 in particular.”111 
Although the court in Cheatam did not discuss the precise bounds 
of a trial court’s discretion to admit expert testimony on cross-racial mis-
identification,112 a careful review of Washington’s general admissibility 
standards for expert testimony demonstrates that Washington State trial 
courts enjoy especially wide discretion to admit such testimony—more 
than many in the legal community might expect.113 As is explained be-
low, a trial court has discretion to admit such testimony whenever the 
issue of cross-racial misidentification is relevant and the proffered expert 
is sufficiently knowledgeable and experienced to opine. In some cases, it 
may even be an abuse of discretion to exclude a proffered expert’s testi-
mony.114 
                                                 
 110. See Pezdek, supra note 35, at 41–42. 
 111. State v. Cheatam, 81 P.3d 830, 842 (Wash. 2003); see WASH. R. EVID. 702 (“If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”). 
 112. See Cheatam, 81 P.3d at 842. 
 113. See discussion infra Part IV.A–C. 
 114. Cf., e.g., State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1115–17 (Utah 2009) (trial court abused its 
discretion by excluding eyewitness expert testimony from murder trial in which cross-racial identifi-
cation and other key factors affecting reliability were relevant); McKibbin v. City of Seattle, No. 
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A. General Admissibility of Scientific Expert Testimony 
Under Washington law, in order to determine the admissibility of 
scientific expert testimony, a trial court must conduct a threshold inquiry 
into reliability and relevance.115 Washington courts generally oversee the 
use of evidence in trials in order to “secure fairness in administration,” to 
eliminate “unjustifiable expense and delay,” and so that “the truth may 
be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.”116 Accordingly, 
Washington courts regulate the admission of expert testimony in particu-
lar to exclude any such testimony that might mislead the jury to the prej-
udice of an opposing party, or that would not be helpful to the jury, thus 
wasting time and resources and needlessly distracting from the merits of 
the case.117 Yet it is the role of the jury, not the court, to assess the 
weight and credibility of admissible testimony.118 Thus, the court’s 
threshold inquiry into admissibility is limited. 
With these principles in mind, the Washington State Supreme Court 
has enumerated three basic requirements for the admissibility of scien-
tific expert testimony.119 First, the testimony must address matters be-
yond common knowledge that are relevant to the case at hand, or in other 
words, the testimony must be helpful to the trier of fact.120 Helpfulness to 
the trier of fact is construed broadly.121 Second, the expert’s opinion must 
be based upon principles or theories generally accepted in the relevant 
scientific community.122 This is sometimes referred to as the “Frye 
test,”123 named after the seminal case Frye v. United States.124 Third, the 
individual providing the testimony must qualify as an expert.125 
                                                                                                             
65177-3-I, 2011 WL 2120084, at *3–4 (Wash. Ct. App. May 31, 2011) (reversing trial court’s deci-
sion to exclude expert testimony from proffered expert who had specifically studied topic at issue). 
 115. See Reese v. Stroh, 907 P.2d 282, 285–86 (Wash. 1995); see also Cheatam, 81 P.3d at 
830, 840; State v. Ward, 777 P.2d 1066, 1067 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). 
 116. WASH. R. EVID. 102. 
 117. See State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304, 1313 (Wash. 1996) (court seeks to avoid “complex, 
expensive, and time-consuming courtroom dramas” and thus “insulates the adversary system” from 
unreliable expert testimony (internal quotations omitted)); Gerberg v. Crosby, 329 P.2d 184, 188 
(Wash. 1958) (“[T]he important question is whether [expert testimony] will mislead the trier of fact 
to the prejudice of the objecting party.”). 
 118. Larson v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 524 P.2d 251, 254 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (“[O]nce the expert 
testimony is admitted into evidence, its weight and credibility is like all other evidence to be consid-
ered by the jury.”). 
 119. See Cheatam, 81 P.3d at 840. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Philippides v. Bernard, 88 P.3d 939, 947 (Wash. 2004). 
 122. Cheatam, 81 P.3d at 840. 
 123. See, e.g., Anderson v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., 260 P.3d 857, 859, 860–868 (Wash. 
2011). 
 124. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 125. Cheatam, 81 P.3d at 840. 
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The first two prongs of the test for admitting scientific testimony 
pose little obstacle to the admissibility of expert testimony on cross-
racial misidentification in relevant cases. First, testimony on eyewitness 
misidentification and cross-racial bias, when sufficiently relevant, will be 
helpful to the jury.126 Although evidence over the past thirty years 
demonstrates that cross-racial identification is distinctly less reliable and 
more prone to error, studies show that most jurors remain ill-informed 
about these issues.127 Thus, scientific testimony on the subject will help 
most jurors decide what weight to give to eyewitness evidence. Second, 
cross-racial bias is generally accepted in the scientific community: in a 
2001 survey of sixty-four eminent experts on eyewitness research, 90% 
agreed that the cross-race effect is reliable enough to be presented in 
court.128 And since that time, the phenomenon has only gained in eviden-
tiary support and acceptance.129 In any case, the cross-race effect has 
been demonstrated and investigated using generally accepted scientific 
methods,130 which alone is sufficient to satisfy the Frye test.131 Therefore, 
expert testimony on cross-racial eyewitness bias, when sufficiently rele-
vant, should be admissible in Washington State trial courts as long as the 
third prong of the test for admissibility—that the testifying individual 
must qualify as an expert—is met. 
B. Qualifying as an Expert Witness 
The qualification of an expert witness is a discretionary matter that 
is subject to discrete legal standards. Initially, determining whether a tes-
                                                 
 126. See sources cited supra notes 33, 54, 57–58, 94–95. 
 127. See sources cited supra notes 33, 54, 57–58, 94–95. 
 128. Kassin et al., supra note 59, at 412. 
 129. See, e.g., John Paul Wilson et al., The Cross-Race Effect and Eyewitness Identification: 
How to Improve Recognition and Reduce Decision Errors in Eyewitness Situations, 7 SOC. ISSUES & 
POL’Y REV. 83, 84, 104, 108 (2013) (“Psychologists have documented the [Cross-Race Effect 
(CRE)] for nearly half a century, and in the past decade psychologists have substantially increased 
our understanding of its antecedents and potential ways to ameliorate this troubling bias. . . . The 
evidence for the CRE is reliable, robust, and overwhelming. . . . We know more than we have ever 
known about the CRE, and we are increasingly confident that the existing body of work must be 
used to inform eyewitness identification policy.” (citation omitted)); NAS REPORT, supra note 36, at 
66–67. 
 130. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 129; Malpass et al., supra note 34, at 10, 15–17 (“Ex-
perimental psychology and the applied field of eyewitness identification and memory are widely 
recognized as fields of scientific study, embodying the techniques, methodologies, and standards that 
define science in relation to other forms of knowledge. . . . As with other scientific communities, 
there is general agreement about the scientific findings of the eyewitness community. . . . Important 
examples . . . include topics such as the cross-race effect . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 131. See Anderson v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., 260 P.3d 857, 859, 860–63, 863–68 (Wash. 
2011) (“The Frye test is only implicated where the opinion offered is based upon novel science.”). 
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tifying individual properly qualifies as an expert falls within the trial 
court’s discretion.132 Review under an abuse of discretion standard is es-
pecially appropriate when a determination is “fact intensive and involves 
numerous factors to be weighed on a case-by-case basis,” and is one for 
which “no rule of general applicability” could be effectively construct-
ed.133 In the case of expert qualification, there is no cut-and-dry formula; 
rather, many different experiences, educational or otherwise, of varying 
duration, may contribute to an expert’s capacity to understand and pre-
sent information that is outside common knowledge and that will be 
helpful to the jury. Thus, the trial court’s determination of an expert’s 
qualification will require a case-by-case, fact-intensive, totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis. 
A review of Washington case law reveals that, in order for a pro-
posed witness to be deemed qualified as an expert in Washington, the 
witness must possess both legitimacy and proficiency in the relevant area 
of expertise.134 First, the witness must possess some requisite amount of 
skill, experience, training, or education to legitimize her relevant 
knowledge and understanding.135 Second, the witness must demonstrate 
proficiency in the particular subject matter at issue and be able to articu-
late a reasonable basis for her specific testimony.136 Testimony from a 
proposed expert possessing both legitimacy and proficiency is admissi-
ble; evaluating the credibility and weight of that testimony is for the fact-
finder.137 
Washington courts have broad discretion in evaluating the legitima-
cy of a proposed expert, but legitimacy is not a stringent requirement. 
Washington Rule of Evidence 702 clearly states that one can qualify as 
an expert based on skill, experience, training, or education.138 According-
ly, a witness need not possess traditional, formal academic credentials in 
order to qualify as an expert on a given subject.139 A witness must simply 
possess skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to legitimize 
                                                 
 132. Harris v. Robert C. Groth, M.D., Inc., P.S., 663 P.2d 113, 119 (Wash. 1983). 
 133. State v. Sisouvanh, 290 P.3d 942, 949 (Wash. 2012) (internal quotations omitted). 
 134. See sources cited infra notes 139–147. 
 135. See sources cited infra notes 139–142. 
 136. See sources cited infra notes 143–147. 
 137. See cases cited supra note 118; infra note 142. 
 138. See WASH. R. EVID. 702. 
 139. See, e.g., State v. McPherson, 46 P.3d 284, 293 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (no abuse of dis-
cretion in permitting police detective without chemistry degree to testify on manufacture of meth-
amphetamine where detective had investigated many meth labs, passed training courses, and attend-
ed conferences on the subject of meth labs); Goodman v. Boeing Co., 877 P.2d 703, 715 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1994) (noting the “general trend in the law of evidence” is “away from reliance on formal titles 
or degrees”); Harris v. Robert C. Groth, M.D., P.S., 663 P.2d 113, 119 (Wash. 1983) (same). 
884 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:861 
her purported scientific, technical, or otherwise specialized expertise. In 
some cases, training or education in a related or underlying field may 
suffice.140 Although the legitimacy requirement is not stringent, it is 
highly discretionary because each determination depends upon the par-
ticular qualifications of the proposed expert and the specific subject mat-
ter of testimony. Under the abuse of discretion standard, if a supposed 
expert’s underlying qualifications are “fairly debatable,” the trial court’s 
conclusion as to the expert’s legitimacy will not be reversed on appeal.141 
On the other hand, if a proposed expert’s basic legitimacy is beyond re-
proach, any arguable deficiencies in the expert’s underlying qualifica-
tions must go to weight rather than admissibility.142 
Comparatively, the proficiency requirement is more straightforward 
and more easily met: the witness must simply have a specific and reason-
able basis for his particular testimony.143 It would be an abuse of discre-
tion, for example, to admit the testimony of a supposed expert who ad-
mits to having no familiarity with the specific topic on which he purports 
to testify, notwithstanding legitimate underlying qualifications in the 
general subject area.144 Mere reference to a “review of the literature,” 
                                                 
 140. See Swanson v. Hood, 170 P. 135, 139 (Wash. 1918) (osteopathic physician who had 
never practiced allopathy but had theoretical knowledge of allopathy from “the study of books” was 
sufficiently qualified to opine as an expert on the subject); Goodman, 877 P.2d at 715–16 (registered 
nurse with many years of experience and nursing degree properly allowed to testify on whether 
victim’s medical condition would have deteriorated in twelve years so as to require a personal com-
panion); State v. Brooks, 557 P.2d 362, 366 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (no abuse of discretion where 
court permitted witness whose primary field of expertise was serology and tool-marking compari-
sons to testify as a ballistics expert); cf. McKibbin v. City of Seattle, No. 65177-3-I, 2011 WL 
2120084, at *3–4 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (reversing trial court’s decision to exclude expert testimony 
from witness with bachelor’s degree in physics who had specifically studied topic at issue). 
 141. McPherson, 46 P.3d at 292. 
 142. See Nordstrom v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp., 453 P.2d 619, 625 (Wash. 
1969) (“[T]he fact that a witness may not be informed as to the latest developments will affect the 
weight . . . but it does not render the evidence altogether irrelevant or incompetent.”); Keegan v. 
Grant Cnty. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 2, 661 P.2d 146, 151–52 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (excluding expert 
with ten years of appraisal experience from testifying to the value of residential home held abuse of 
discretion, notwithstanding fact that witness was not licensed in Washington and was primarily 
experienced in appraising nonresidential properties); see also Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 476 
P.2d 713, 715 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970) (“Any supposed deficiencies in . . . qualifications would go to 
the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence, [once] the basic requisite qualifications are 
shown.”). 
 143. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 738 P.2d 665, 676 (Wash. 1987) (noting that it 
would be “too easy to merely announce the simplicity of reverse engineering without a solid basis”). 
 144. See Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Cent. Nat’l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 882 P.2d 703, 730–32 
(Wash. 1994) (trial court abused its discretion in admitting testimony of insurance underwriter on 
materiality of certain representations where underwriter could not state a generally accepted standard 
of practice and admitted to having no knowledge of the practices of the particular syndicates at is-
sue); Boeing Co., 738 P.2d at 674–75 (engineer’s testimony on whether design could be reverse-
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moreover, is insufficient to establish a purported expert’s proficiency 
with a specific topic.145 Instead, the expert witness must be able to articu-
late reasonable and specific support for his particular testimony.146 And 
again, the trial court’s ruling will be upheld as long as the expert’s quali-
fication to opine is “fairly debatable.”147 
The requirements of legitimacy and proficiency are lenient for 
many reasons. First, the role of the court in determining admissibility is 
to admit or exclude evidence based on whether the proffered testimony is 
sufficiently relevant to assist the jury and is not misleading—a minimal 
threshold inquiry.148 The jury, on the other hand, finds facts; it is the ju-
ry’s role to determine the relative weight of evidence that is admitted and 
presented.149 Jurors are free to assign less weight to testimony from ex-
perts with less impressive or specialized credentials, and opposing coun-
sel is also free to emphasize to the jury a given expert’s failings and 
shortcomings. 
Second, an expert who possesses sufficient education or training in 
one subject area frequently will possess the necessary knowledge or 
skillset to become an expert in a more specific or related subject area.150 
In other words, experts are not required to remain strictly within their 
particular areas of formal training and may be given latitude to learn and 
explore subspecialties or related fields. 
Third, it may be difficult to obtain the services of a renowned or 
traditional expert in a given field, and at the same time, someone who is 
a legitimate and proficient source of knowledge on the subject still can 
be helpful to the jury. Obtaining an expert will be especially difficult 
when a party is economically disadvantaged or the subject matter is high-
                                                                                                             
engineered was properly excluded where engineer admitted to having almost no experience with 
“reverse engineering of the type needed” and offered no basis for his testimony on that subject). 
 145. State v. Madison, 770 P.2d 662, 668 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). 
 146. See, e.g., Boeing Co., 738 P.2d 665, 674–75 (engineer’s testimony on whether design 
could be reverse-engineered was properly excluded where engineer offered no basis for his testimo-
ny on that subject). 
 147. State v. McPherson, 46 P.3d 284, 292 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). 
 148. See cases cited supra notes 118, 142. 
 149. See cases cited supra notes 118, 142. 
 150. See Swanson v. Hood, 170 P. 135, 139 (Wash. 1918) (osteopathic physician became ex-
pert on allopathic medicine); McPherson, 46 P.3d at 292–93 (police officer became expert on meth-
amphetamine production); State v. Brooks, 557 P.2d 362, 366 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (serologist and 
tool-marking expert became expert on ballistics); cf. Lappe v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 857 F. 
Supp. 222, 226–27 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (“[W]here an expert has the education or background to permit 
him to analyze a given set of circumstances, he can through reading, calculations, and reasoning 
from known scientific principles make himself very much an expert in the particular product even 
though he has not had actual experience [in it].” (quotations omitted)), aff’d sub nom. Lappe v. Hon-
da Motor Co. Ltd. of Japan, 101 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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ly specialized, as with cross-racial misidentification.151 In cases involving 
cross-racial identification, many defendants are indigent and lack suffi-
cient funds to afford the few premier specialists who devote their careers 
to studying the phenomenon of cross-racial bias.152 These defendants still 
may and should be allowed to present expert testimony on cross-racial 
bias to the jury, so long as their proffered experts are legitimate and pro-
ficient. 
C. Qualifying as an Expert on Cross-Racial Misidentification 
As explained above, Washington courts will permit expert testimo-
ny on cross-racial misidentification so long as the proffered expert is le-
gitimate and proficient. A witness may be considered sufficiently legiti-
mate to present expert testimony on cross-racial misidentification if the 
witness possesses the educational background necessary to understand 
the relevant scientific literature.153 A degree in various fields of psychol-
ogy, sociology, or statistics might suffice for that purpose,154 especially if 
combined with training or additional education on the particular topic of 
eyewitness identification or cross-racial bias.155 A witness will be suffi-
ciently proficient to present on cross-racial bias if the witness has re-
viewed and understands the relevant scientific research and publications 
                                                 
 151. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL 
CASES 1 (2000), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf (“At the end of their 
case approximately . . . 82% of felony defendants in large State courts were represented by public 
defenders or assigned counsel.”); See Douglas Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent De-
fense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 375 (1995) (“In the mid-1980s, 
specialists on eyewitness identification cost approximately $500 per day for courtroom testimony 
and $100 per hour for consultation . . . .”); KING CNTY. OFFICE OF THE PUB. DEFENDER, EXPERT 
SERVICES POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 2, 4 (2008), available at http://www.kingcounty.gov/courts/ 
OPD/Partners/~/media/courts/OPD/documents/Expert_Services_FINAL_revised_6_20_11.ashx 
(award of funds for expert is discretionary, and generally must not exceed $500 for an eyewitness 
expert); see also, e.g., State v. Hernandez, 773 P.2d 857, 869–71 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (affirming 
trial court’s refusal to appoint eyewitness expert for defendant), rev’d on other grounds by State v. 
Batista, 808 P.2d 1141 (Wash. 1991). 
 152. See sources cited supra note 151; see also State v. Griffin, No. 37732–9–I, 1998 WL 
372734, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. July 6, 1998) (denial of motion for expert witness); State v. O’Dell, 
854 P.2d 1096, 1098 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (trial court refused defendant’s “motion for expert wit-
ness funds” to allow well-known professor to testify on eyewitness misidentification). 
 153. Cf., e.g., Swanson, 170 P. at 139 (osteopathic physician became expert on allopathic med-
icine). 
 154. Cf. McKibbin v. City of Seattle, No. 65177–3–I, 2011 WL 2120084, at *3–4 (Wash. Ct. 
App. May 31, 2011) (witness with bachelor’s degree in physics qualified because he had specifically 
studied topic at issue). 
 155. Cf. McPherson, 46 P.3d at 284, 288, 293 (police detective without chemistry degree quali-
fied as expert on manufacture of methamphetamine where detective had investigated several meth 
labs, passed training courses, and attended conferences on the subject of meth labs). 
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in the field and can explain how that literature supports her particular 
conclusions.156 
A proposed expert witness need not be disqualified from testifying 
simply because she is not highly specialized in cross-racial bias, did not 
perform her own research in the field, or is not informed as to the most 
recent studies on cross-racial bias.157 At the same time, that a proffered 
expert arguably has sufficient legitimacy and proficiency to be deemed 
qualified does not mean that the witness will “always or even usually be 
allowed to testify.”158 Instead, trial courts “retain broad discretion” in 
deciding whether to admit such testimony, unless the expert’s qualifica-
tion (or lack thereof) is beyond debate.159 
V. DISCRETION OF WASHINGTON STATE TRIAL COURTS TO PERMIT JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS ON CROSS-RACIAL MISIDENTIFICATION 
Jury instruction on cross-racial misidentification usually consists of 
a brief explanation of the fallibility of eyewitness identifications, with a 
special emphasis on cross-racial identifications, and with a caution to the 
jury to consider such evidence with great care. In general, a trial court’s 
discretion to fashion appropriate jury instructions in any given case is 
very broad.160 In State v. Allen, the Washington State Supreme Court ad-
dressed the discretion trial courts are afforded to permit or refuse to give 
instructions on cross-racial misidentification.161 
The court in Allen upheld a particular trial court’s refusal to instruct 
on cross-racial misidentification.162 Seven of nine justices contributed to 
the judgment in one lead opinion and two concurring opinions, and all 
                                                 
 156. Cf. id.; Swanson, 170 P. at 138 (expert was qualified in part because “he had studied cer-
tain works”); Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 738 P.2d 665, 676 (Wash. 1987) (noting that it would 
be “too easy to merely announce the simplicity of reverse engineering without a solid basis”). 
 157. See McPherson, 46 P.3d at 292–93; Swanson, 170 P. at 139; Nordstrom v. White Metal 
Rolling & Stamping Corp., 453 P.2d 619, 623–24 (Wash. 1969). 
 158. Harris v. Robert C. Groth, M.D., Inc., P.S., 663 P.2d 113, 119 (Wash. 1983). 
 159. Id. 
 160. See State v. Dana, 439 P.2d 403, 405 (Wash. 1968) (“While each party is entitled to have 
his theory of the case set forth in the court’s instructions, it is axiomatic that the trial court has con-
siderable discretion in how the instructions will be worded. It is also axiomatic that the instructions 
must be read as a whole.” (citation omitted)); see also State v. Hathaway, 251 P.3d 253, 261 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2011) (“Jury instructions are sufficient if substantial evidence supports them, they allow the 
parties to argue their theories of the case, and, when read as a whole, they properly inform the jury of 
the applicable law.”); State v. Portrey, 10 P.3d 481, 484 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (“A trial court has 
considerable discretion in the wording of a jury instruction so long as the instruction correctly states 
the law and allows each party to argue its theory of the case.”). 
 161. See generally State v. Allen, 294 P.3d 679 (Wash. 2013). 
 162. See id. at 687 (affirming trial court’s refusal to give instruction on cross-racial misidenti-
fication). 
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seven unanimously agreed that the giving or refusal of a jury instruction 
on cross-racial misidentification is subject to review for abuse of discre-
tion163 and that such an instruction is not an unconstitutional judicial 
comment on the evidence.164 Notwithstanding potential disagreements 
among these justices as to tangential issues, Allen thus confirms that un-
der Washington law, trial courts are afforded wide discretion to issue 
jury instructions on cross-racial misidentification when relevant.165 The 
same seven justices concluded that the trial court in Allen had not abused 
its discretion in refusing to give a cross-racial misidentification instruc-
tion in that case, in large part because the identification at issue was an 
identification of apparel and sunglasses rather than facial features, and 
thus did not necessarily implicate cross-racial bias.166 
Although the court in Allen did not resolve the precise limits of a 
trial court’s ability to refuse an instruction on cross-racial misidentifica-
tion, there is good reason to believe that in many instances, such refusal 
                                                 
 163. See id. at 686 (refusing to apply a “rigid prohibition against the giving of a cautionary 
cross-racial identification instruction” because “such a prohibition would be inconsistent with the 
abuse of discretion standard”); id. at 690 (Madsen, C.J., concurring) (“I agree . . . that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in this case . . . [but] a trial judge [could] abuse his or her discretion [by 
refusing] to provide a cross-racial identification instruction.”); id. at 691 (Chambers, J., concurring) 
(“I also agree . . . we cannot say the trial judge abused her discretion . . . .”). 
 164. See id. at 686 n.7 (rejecting the argument that “a cross-racial identification instruction . . . 
is prohibited as an unconstitutional comment on the evidence”); id. at 690 (Madsen, C.J., concur-
ring) (“[A] trial judge [could] abuse his or her discretion [by refusing] to provide a cross-racial iden-
tification instruction.”); id. at 691 (Chambers, J., concurring) (“I also stress that we have long reject-
ed the contention that such instructions function as unconstitutional comments on the evidence.”). 
 165. Notwithstanding the fact that Allen was decided based on a lead opinion of four justices, a 
concurring opinion of one justice, and an additional concurring opinion of two justices, whatever 
rationales were agreed upon by at least five justices contributing to the final judgment constitute the 
holdings of the case and are binding on lower courts. See W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Dep’t of Rev-
enue, 973 P.2d 1011, 1017–18 (Wash. 1999) (noting that to the extent a majority of justices “in the 
lead and concurring opinions” agree upon a rationale, that rationale “is controlling” in future cases); 
see also In re Pers. Restraint of Francis, 242 P.3d 866, 873 n.7 (Wash. 2010) (“When there is no 
majority opinion, the holding is the narrowest ground upon which a majority agreed. In Shale, the 
lead opinion and concurrence agreed only in the result: double jeopardy was not violated in Shale’s 
case.”); All-Pure Chem. Co. v. White, 896 P.2d 697, 700 (Wash. 1995) (rationale agreed upon in 
plurality and concurring opinions was holding of prior case). As discussed above, all of the justices 
contributing to the final judgment in Allen reasoned that the abuse of discretion standard applies to a 
trial court’s decision whether to permit jury instruction on cross-racial misidentification, and in 
general, a trial court’s discretion to fashion appropriate jury instructions in any given case is ex-
tremely wide. 
 166. See Allen, 294 P.3d at 686 (“Providing a cautionary cross-racial identification instruction 
would not have added to the safeguards operating in Allen’s case, a case involving an eyewitness 
identification based on general physique, apparel, and sunglasses, and not on facial features.”); id. at 
690 (Madsen, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case because 
there was no indication that [the] identification of Bryan Allen was based upon facial features or 
other specific physical characteristics beyond the mere fact that Allen is African American.”). 
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will be an abuse of discretion and a potential ground for reversal on ap-
peal. In general, a “defendant in a criminal case is entitled to have the 
jury fully instructed on the defense theory of the case.”167 Moreover, cau-
tionary jury instructions are sometimes required when dubious categories 
of evidence are admitted at trial against a criminal defendant.168 The 
Washington State Supreme Court also retains inherent authority and 
broad discretion over all court rules and procedures, including jury in-
structions.169 In Allen, a majority of justices, in the concurring and dis-
senting opinions, suggested that a trial court’s refusal to provide an in-
struction on cross-racial misidentification would be an abuse of discre-
tion in certain circumstances, such as when “a victim makes a cross-
racial identification based on a suspect’s facial features, hair, or other 
physical characteristic implicating race,”170 or at least when “eyewitness 
identification is a central issue in a case, there is little evidence corrobo-
rating the identification, and the defendant specifically requests the in-
struction.”171 The lead opinion also noted that in some cases, “the use of 
expert evidence may be limited due to cost,”172 and it stands to reason 
that an instruction could be required in those circumstances as well. The 
various opinions in Allen thus provide persuasive authority indicating 
that refusal to give a cross-racial misidentification instruction may con-
stitute an abuse of discretion in many cases.173 
In sum, Washington trial courts have broad discretion to give jury 
instructions on cross-racial misidentification whenever relevant, and a 
trial court’s refusal to give such an instruction may even be an abuse of 
discretion in many cases. Although the precise limits of a trial court’s 
discretion to refuse such an instruction remain unsettled, refusal likely 
                                                 
 167. State v. Staley, 872 P.2d 502, 507 (Wash. 1994). 
 168. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 685 P.2d 584, 588 (Wash. 1984) (requiring cautionary instruc-
tion if accomplice testimony is to be admitted without sufficient corroboration), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Brown, 782 P.2d 1013, 1032 (Wash. 1989); State v. Renfro, 639 P.2d 737, 739–
40 (Wash. 1982) (requiring cautionary instruction if stipulated polygraph evidence is to be admit-
ted). 
 169. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 2.04.190 (1987); State ex rel. Foster-Wyman Lumber Co. 
v. Superior Court, 267 P. 770, 771–73 (Wash. 1928). 
 170. Allen, 294 P.3d at 690–91 (Madsen, C.J., concurring). 
 171. Id. at 691 (Chambers, J., concurring); see also id. at 692 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). 
 172. Id. at 686 n.6. 
 173. See Spain v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 185 P.3d 1188, 1192 n.8 (Wash. 2008) (noting that “[a] 
holding of a plurality of the court may be persuasive”); In re Pers. Restraint of Isadore, 88 P.3d 390, 
393 (Wash. 2004) (following rationale of “[t]he three concurring justices and the two dissenting 
justices” in prior case); Southcenter Joint Venture v. Nat’l Democratic Policy Comm., 780 P.2d 
1282, 1289–91 (Wash. 1989) (adopting rationale agreed upon by five justices in concurrence and 
dissent of prior case); State v. Nikolich, 241 P. 664, 666 (Wash. 1925) (noting that “a deliberate 
expression of the court,” even if dicta, should not be “disregarded”). 
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will be held an abuse of discretion if a cross-racial identification is cen-
tral to the case and lacks substantial corroboration. 
VI. TRIAL COURTS SHOULD ALLOW EXPERT TESTIMONY AND JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS ON CROSS-RACIAL MISIDENTIFICATION WHENEVER 
RELEVANT 
Trial courts in Washington should exercise their wide discretion 
regularly to allow expert testimony and jury instructions on cross-racial 
misidentification whenever relevant. The proper admission and use of 
these interventions in such cases will result in a number of benefits to the 
criminal justice system. 
First, as explained above, the regular use of these tools to educate 
jurors in criminal trials will likely prevent wrongful convictions, mitigate 
racial disparity, and improve police and prosecutorial practices within the 
criminal justice system.174 Notably, the use of expert testimony in com-
bination with jury instructions may be more effective than either tool 
used separately.175 
Second, regularly permitting expert testimony and jury instructions 
on cross-racial misidentification will avoid needless reversals on appeal. 
As explained above, a proffered expert with legitimacy and proficiency 
must be allowed to testify, and these standards are lenient, albeit discre-
tionary.176 Further, a trial court’s discretion to refuse a jury instruction on 
cross-racial misidentification is likely very limited, whereas the discre-
tion to give such an instruction remains quite broad.177 The safer course, 
then, is to give such an instruction whenever relevant. 
Third, in many cases a defendant may be unable to afford a leading 
specialist to testify as an expert witness, and in such cases, liberal appli-
cation of the standards governing expert qualification and the use of jury 
instructions will be especially appropriate.178 Jury instruction in particu-
lar is a low-cost and effective tool in such circumstances. 
To obtain the benefits described above and to address the problem 
of cross-racial misidentification effectively and appropriately, Washing-
ton State trial courts should allow expert testimony and jury instructions 
on cross-racial bias whenever a cross-racial identification is relied upon 
                                                 
 174. See supra Part III. 
 175. See, e.g., Leippe et al., supra note 33, at 534 (finding that mock expert testimony “served 
to significantly lower perceptions of guilt and believability of the eyewitness” only in combination 
with jury instructions). 
 176. See supra Part IV. 
 177. See supra Part V. 
 178. See supra notes 151–152 and accompanying text. 
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as evidence and the cross-race effect is relevant to the accuracy of the 
identification. That remains true regardless of whether the identification 
is central to the proponent’s case, because whatever the relevance of the 
identification, the jury is likely to give it undue weight without expert 
testimony or instruction.179 If the identification is not necessary or rele-
vant to the proponent’s case, then it need not be relied upon; but if it is 
relied upon, then corrective measures should be used to ensure fairness 
and accuracy. And if a trial court determines that expert testimony in a 
given case would be overly time-consuming relative to the importance of 
the eyewitness identification to the case as a whole, then either the iden-
tification should be excluded as too unreliable or prejudicial or jury in-
structions should be used. 
As Washington State trial courts and criminal justice practitioners 
begin to implement these trial tools on a regular basis, additional efforts 
also should be undertaken to increase effectiveness. First, an ongoing list 
of qualified experts should be developed and made available to practi-
tioners. Second, pattern jury instructions should be developed and for-
mally adopted. As discussed below, such efforts would provide useful 
support for judges and practitioners and would increase the effectiveness 
of expert testimony and jury instruction to prevent wrongful convictions. 
A. Developing an Expert Pool 
Providing practitioners with a running list of identified and availa-
ble experts on cross-racial misidentification would promote the regular 
and effective use of both expert testimony and jury instruction on the 
subject. Optimally, a neutral party would compile and make publicly 
available a list of potential experts on eyewitness misidentification and 
cross-racial bias in Washington State. The list would not be limited to 
only the most renowned specialists—it would include any substantially 
qualified experts who can properly opine on cross-racial misidentifica-
tion. The list also would include costs of retention and geographic avail-
ability to the extent such information could be collected. Developing an 
expert pool in this manner would promote the accessibility and use of 
such experts. It also would allow practitioners to determine when expert 
testimony cannot be obtained and, in those circumstances, would support 
the use of jury instructions as an alternative. The Fred T. Korematsu 
Center for Law and Equality at Seattle University School of Law (the 
Korematsu Center) is actively promoting reforms in this area and intends 
to compile and maintain such a list and to make it publicly available on 
                                                 
 179. See supra text accompanying notes 54–58. 
892 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:861 
the organization’s website. This novel approach to facilitating expert tes-
timony should prove to be useful for attorneys, trial judges, and the crim-
inal justice system as a whole. 
B. Developing Pattern Jury Instructions 
As Washington State trial courts begin to instruct juries on cross-
racial misidentification on a regular basis, a pattern instruction on the 
subject also should be developed and adopted. In Washington State, the 
Washington Pattern Instructions Committee regularly drafts and reviews 
pattern instructions, which are made available to and relied upon by trial 
judges throughout the state.180 These pattern instructions are “merely per-
suasive authority” and are “not the law,”181 but nevertheless serve as “an 
immense aid to the bench and bar in selecting appropriate jury instruc-
tions” and in general “are to be used in preference to individually drafted 
instructions.”182 Thus, a pattern instruction on cross-racial misidentifica-
tion would be very useful and should be adopted. 
Other courts have undertaken similar efforts, but without sufficient 
basis in empirical and scientific research. Perhaps the most well-known 
set of instructions on eyewitness misidentification was drafted in 1972, 
in United States v. Telfaire.183 From that time, the so-called “Telfaire 
instructions” have served as the basis for model instructions adopted in 
various courts throughout the United States.184 Unfortunately, the 
                                                 
 180. See, e.g., WASH. PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS COMM., PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (2014), 
available at https://www.courts.wa.gov/index.cfm?fa=home.contentDisplay&location= 
PatternJuryInstructions. 
 181. State v. Hayward, 217 P.3d 354, 361–62 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). 
 182. Bradley v. Maurer, 560 P.2d 719, 724 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977). 
 183. United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 184. See, e.g., Sheehan, supra note 25, at 654. The Telfaire instructions are lengthy and were 
provided as an appendix to the court’s decision in that case. Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 558–59. The in-
structions begin with a discussion of burdens of proof, followed by a statement that “[i]dentification 
testimony is an expression of belief or impression by the witness [and its] value depends on the 
opportunity the witness had to observe the offender at the time of the offense and to make a reliable 
identification later.” Id. at 558. The instructions then direct that “[i]n appraising the identification 
testimony of a witness, you should consider the following,” which is followed by a number of ques-
tions with explanatory discussions, such as: 
Are you satisfied that the identification made by the witness subsequent to the offense 
was the product of his own recollection? . . . If the identification by the witness may have 
been influenced by the circumstances under which the defendant was presented to him 
for identification, you should scrutinize the identification with great care. 
Id. In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Bazelon emphasized the problem of cross-racial misidenti-
fication in particular and provided a suggested instruction on that issue: 
In this case the identifying witness is of a different race than the defendant. In the experi-
ence of many it is more difficult to identify members of a different race than members of 
one’s own. If this is also your own experience, you may consider it in evaluating the wit-
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Telfaire instructions predate much of the relevant research on jury in-
struction and eyewitness misidentification; they were drafted with little 
to no empirical basis and have demonstrated little to no effect in research 
experiments.185 In other words, the Telfaire instructions are poorly con-
structed and should be abandoned or refined. More recently, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court ordered its Model Criminal Jury Charge Commit-
tee to draft proposed revisions to New Jersey’s pattern instructions on 
eyewitness misidentification.186 Unfortunately, it appears from the 
Committee’s report that its recommendations are based largely on theo-
retical discussion among committee members rather than empirical re-
search.187 And as to cross-racial misidentification in particular, the 
Committee’s report provides little discussion and identifies no empirical 
basis for its proposed pattern instruction.188 As the research on the 
Telfaire instructions has demonstrated, jury instructions that are designed 
in theory to educate jurors and improve decisionmaking often prove to be 
ineffectual in practice, notwithstanding the best of intentions. 
Washington courts can and should do better. Pattern jury instruc-
tions on cross-racial misidentification should incorporate empirical and 
scientific research in an attempt to induce juror sensitivity.189 In general, 
studies indicate that for jury instructions to be understandable and effec-
tive, they must adhere to established principles of psycholinguistics, such 
as the use of logical structuring and the avoidance of uncommon words, 
passive constructions, or compound sentences.190 Research also demon-
strates that sufficient specificity of information is critical to inducing 
meaningful understanding.191 Numerous experiments also have sought to 
identify and develop effective instructions on eyewitness misidentifica-
tion, with a limited number of studies addressing cross-racial misidentifi-
                                                                                                             
ness’s testimony. You must also consider, of course, whether there are other factors pre-
sent in this case which overcome any such difficulty of identification. For example, you 
may conclude that the witness has had sufficient contacts with members of the defend-
ant’s race that he would not have greater difficulty in making a reliable identification. 
Id. at 561 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). 
 185. See Devenport et al., supra note 15, at 62–64; Martire & Kemp, The Impact of Eyewitness 
Expert Evidence, supra note 92, at 226. 
 186. See N.J. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON MODEL CRIMINAL JURY CHARGES, REPORT OF THE 
SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON MODEL CRIMINAL JURY CHARGES ON THE REVISIONS TO THE 
IDENTIFICATION MODEL CHARGES 1 (2012), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/criminal/ 
ModelCrimJuryChargeCommHENDERSONREPORT.pdf. 
 187. See generally id. 
 188. See id. at 32–33. 
 189. See supra text accompanying notes 92–97, 107–108. 
 190. Greene, supra note 107, at 261–62. 
 191. Id. at 262. 
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cation in particular.192 The lessons from all of this research, and all future 
research, should be incorporated into any pattern instruction. 
Based on the research to date, the following may be a useful start-
ing point for an effective instruction on cross-racial misidentification: 
The testimony given by an eyewitness is an expression of his or her 
beliefs and those beliefs may or may not be accurate. In general, re-
searchers have found that eyewitness identifications in criminal in-
vestigations are incorrect approximately one-third of the time. You 
should take into account that the confidence displayed by an eye-
witness does not necessarily indicate that the testimony is accurate. 
It is possible for eyewitnesses to be confident and still be wrong. 
Or, eyewitnesses may be unsure but still be correct in their identifi-
cation. You should also take into account that people tend to have 
unique difficulty identifying persons of another race, although this 
is not always the case. In experiments, eyewitnesses trying to identi-
fy a stranger of a different race tend to make a misidentification 
over 1.5 times more often than eyewitnesses identifying a stranger 
of the same race. If, after examining the testimony and all the evi-
dence, you have reasonable doubt that a correct identification was 
made, you must find the defendant not guilty.193 
Pending further research developments, this sample instruction can serve 
either as a starting point for a pattern instruction, or as a model for trial 
judges until a pattern instruction is adopted. Once adopted, any pattern 
instructions on cross-racial misidentification should be revised and up-
dated on an ongoing and regular basis, as further research is conducted 
and more experience with such instructions is gained. 
VII. NEED FOR CONTINUING EDUCATION AND REFORMS ADDRESSING 
CROSS-RACIAL MISIDENTIFICATION 
The problem of cross-racial misidentification is not insurmountable. 
Over time, through education, advocacy, and reform, the wrongful con-
victions resulting from cross-racial misidentifications can be prevented. 
This Article has focused on one useful starting point—the use of expert 
testimony and jury instructions at trial—but the issue remains worthy of 
broader efforts and numerous additional corrective measures. 
Initially, it is important to promote awareness of the problem. This 
will help garner support for reforms and will also increase awareness 
                                                 
 192. See, e.g., id.; Ramirez et al., supra note 108. 
 193. Cf. Ramirez et al., supra note 108, at 55, 60–62 (finding that a similar instruction was 
effective at inducing juror understanding of cross-racial misidentification and unreliability of eye-
witness confidence). 
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among potential jurors. To this end, readers should freely and actively 
discuss the cross-racial misidentification problem with others, and should 
share this Article and other useful materials on the subject. Efforts at in-
creasing awareness should also target and include prosecutors, defenders, 
police, and judges, whose involvement in reform efforts will be critical. 
As awareness of cross-racial misidentification increases, potential 
solutions to the problem should be developed and implemented on an 
ongoing basis. This should include continued research, analysis, debate, 
and education on the scope of the problem and the merits of proposed 
remedies. There are numerous potential remedies that warrant further 
research and discussion. As one example, special rules governing the 
admissibility of eyewitness evidence could be adopted to reflect current 
science and to ensure that particularly unreliable identifications are ex-
cluded before ever reaching the jury.194 As another example, police de-
partments and prosecutors could adopt new policies and procedures in-
tended to ensure the highest degree of reliability or corroboration possi-
ble for any identifications relied upon, or to promote the use of other 
forms of evidence. As yet another example, education on eyewitness 
misidentification could be included as part of an initial, general training 
of potential jurors while they are waiting to be called into particular cas-
es. 
As solutions are implemented, police, prosecutors, defenders, and 
judges should be provided with continuing education on eyewitness sci-
ence, applicable laws and procedures, and best practices.195 It is im-
portant for police and prosecutors to know how best to collect and handle 
eyewitness evidence, for prosecutors and defenders to know when ad-
missibility should be challenged and when to seek experts or request jury 
                                                 
 194. Cf. State v. Ahlfinger, 749 P.2d 190, 192–93 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (noting special rule 
requiring written stipulation by both parties for admission of polygraph evidence and explaining that 
rule could be reconsidered in the future based on new evidence or scientific developments). 
 195. See Wise et al., What U.S. Law Enforcement Officers Know, supra note 26, at 497 (“The 
present survey of a wide array of law officers with diverse positions, ranks and experience from 
several different regions of the U.S. showed that they have limited knowledge of eyewitness factors 
and how memory works. . . . Encouragingly, [most] officers believed that officers should receive 
more training in eyewitness testimony.”); Wise et al., What U.S. Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys 
Know, supra note 26, at 1277–78 (“[T]he majority of both prosecutors and defense attorneys who 
participated in the survey believed that attorneys would benefit from additional training on eyewit-
ness testimony, and also appeared to believe that eyewitness knowledge is not just common 
sense . . . . The prosecutors had limited knowledge of eyewitness factors, appeared to overestimate 
the reliability of eyewitness testimony, and also significantly underestimated eyewitness error’s role 
in wrongful convictions. . . . The defense attorneys appeared to be moderately knowledgeable about 
eyewitness testimony . . . [but] some of their apparent knowledge may reflect skepticism rather than 
knowledge.”). 
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instructions, and for trial judges to know the contours of their discretion 
and the considerations that should guide the exercise of that discretion. 
Numerous organizations are currently pushing for reforms in this 
area. The Korematsu Center, in addition to serving generally as an ongo-
ing source of information and advocacy, is taking discrete steps intended 
to support the proper use of expert testimony and jury instruction on 
cross-racial misidentification in Washington. First, as described above, 
the Korematsu Center is compiling a list of potential experts to facilitate 
the regular use of expert testimony on cross-racial misidentification at 
criminal trials. Second, the Korematsu Center intends to distribute mate-
rials to trial judges throughout Washington to promote awareness of the 
cross-racial misidentification issue and to inform judges of the scope of 
their discretion and the considerations relevant to the exercise of that dis-
cretion. A “bench card” on the cross-racial misidentification issue is at-
tached to this Article as an appendix. This succinct document summariz-
es the relevant background information and legal standards presented in 
this Article and should prove to be useful for Washington’s trial judges. 
The Korematsu Center’s efforts will add to other ongoing efforts in 
Washington to address the problem of eyewitness misidentification, in-
cluding efforts of prosecutors, defenders, and the broader efforts of Inno-
cence Project Northwest, a leading organization on preventing and ad-
dressing wrongful convictions in Washington.196 
In sum, the problem of cross-racial misidentification calls for ac-
tion.197 The use of expert testimony and jury instruction provides a useful 
starting point, but further efforts should be devoted to increasing aware-
ness of the problem, providing ongoing education to criminal justice 
practitioners, and developing and implementing reforms. Each person’s 
efforts aimed at addressing this problem, including raising awareness of 
the problem among the general population, will help to prevent wrongful 
convictions and lessen the number of persons unjustly deprived of liber-
                                                 
 196. See Innocence Project Northwest, U. WASH. SCH. L., 
http://www.law.washington.edu/Clinics/IPNW (last visited Nov. 27, 2014); see also Washington 
Gov. Inslee Signs Wrongful Conviction Compensation Law, INNOCENCE PROJECT (May 10, 2013, 
3:30 PM), http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Washington_Gov_Inslee_Signs_Wrongful_ 
Conviction_Compensation_Law.php (noting recent passage of law in Washington spearheaded by 
Innocence Project Northwest that will make it easier for exonerated individuals to obtain compensa-
tion from the state for wrongful imprisonment). 
 197. See Malpass et al., supra note 34, at 5 (“The point not to miss is this: failures in the devel-
opment of diagnostic procedures for obtaining eyewitness identification evidence, failures in the 
administration of eyewitness identification procedures, and failures in the evaluation of eyewitness 
testimony by police, attorneys, jurors, judges, the public and the American Criminal Justice System, 
considered as a fact-finding entity, have been documented repeatedly over the last 75 years, with 
remarkably little effect (in the U.S.) on the routine operation of these systems of justice.”). 
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ty. With our collective effort, over time, the problem of cross-racial mis-
identification can become a thing of the past. 
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BENCH CARD: EXPERT TESTIMONY AND JURY INSTRUCTION ON CROSS-
RACIAL MISIDENTIFICATION 
 
In State v. Cheatam1 and State v. Allen,2 the Washington State Supreme Court 
held that state trial courts have discretion to allow expert testimony and jury 
instruction on cross-racial misidentification in relevant cases. This Bench 
Card explains the bounds of such discretion, which can be exercised to reduce 
wrongful convictions and racial disparity within the criminal justice system. 
Why have these tools been authorized? 
Expert testimony and jury instruction on cross-racial eyewitness misidentifica-
tion have been authorized because of the need to educate jurors on this subject, 
which falls outside of common knowledge.3   
There are many relevant factors at play: 
• approximately one-third of eyewitness identifications in criminal investiga-
tions are mistaken; 
• cross-racial identifications are over 1.5 times more likely than same-race 
identifications to be mistaken; 
• about 75% of documented wrongful convictions have involved mistaken 
eyewitness identifications; 
• most jurors are unaware of these and other relevant findings; 
• honest but mistaken eyewitnesses often are impervious to cross-
examination; 
• racial minorities are more susceptible to misidentification and face worse 
outcomes once misidentified.4 
Research shows that the use of expert testimony and jury instruction can help to 
educate jurors and prevent them from giving undue weight to cross-racial identi-
fications.5 
What are the bounds of a trial court’s discretion to allow or deny these 
tools? 
Expert testimony:  Expert testimony on cross-racial misidentification is admis-
sible if it is (1) helpful to the jury, (2) based on generally accepted principles, 
                                                 
1. 150 Wn.2d 626, 81 P.3d 830 (2003). 
2. 176 Wn.2d 611, 294 P.3d 679 (2013). 
3. See Cheatam, 150 Wn.2d at 645–46; Allen, 176 Wn.2d at 616–17, 624 & n.7 (C. Johnson, J., lead 
opinion); id. at 632–33 (Madsen, C.J., concurring); id. at 634–35 (Chambers, J., concurring). 
4. See Taki V. Flevaris & Ellie F. Chapman, Cross-Racial Misidentification: A Call to Action in 
Washington State and Beyond, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 861, at Part II (2015).  
5. See id. at Part III. 
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and (3) from a person who is qualified as an expert.6  The first two elements will 
be met whenever cross-racial misidentification is relevant because this phenom-
enon is not a matter of common knowledge, but has gained wide acceptance in 
the scientific community.7 
The third element, qualification, will depend on the circumstances. Qualification 
is a threshold inquiry, distinct from the weight to be given to an expert’s testi-
mony, which is for the jury to decide. A proffered expert need not have the 
foremost degrees, wide recognition, or scholarly publications. As long as the 
proffered expert has a legitimate basis for specialized knowledge on the subject, 
and reasonable proficiency with the particular issues to be discussed, that person 
qualifies as an expert. If a person’s qualification to opine is “fairly debatable,” 
then the trial court has discretion to admit or deny the testimony.8   
Jury instruction: A trial court has wide discretion to craft jury instructions that 
are appropriate for each case.9 A trial court also has discretion to instruct on 
cross-racial misidentification in particular.10 Thus, a trial court can instruct on 
cross-racial misidentification whenever it is relevant. 
In some cases, refusal to instruct will constitute an abuse of discretion. The 
Washington State Supreme Court has not yet decided the precise limits on a trial 
court’s ability to refuse, but many of the Justices have suggested that an instruc-
tion may be required in the following circumstances: 
• when “a victim makes a cross-racial identification based on a suspect’s fa-
cial features, hair, or other physical characteristic implicating race”;11  
• when “eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case, there is little 
evidence corroborating the identification, and the defendant specifically re-
quests the instruction”;12  
• when “the use of expert evidence [is] limited due to cost.”13 
When should these tools be allowed? 
Trial courts should allow expert testimony and jury instruction on cross-racial 
misidentification whenever relevant. Regular use of these tools will reduce 
wrongful convictions and avoid needless reversals on appeal. If a particular 
                                                 
6. Cheatam, 150 Wn.2d at 645. 
7. See, e.g., Cheatam, 150 Wn.2d at 646; Flevaris & Chapman, supra note 4, at Part IV.A. 
8. E.g., State v. McPherson, 111 Wn. App. 747, 761, 46 P.3d 284 (2002); see Flevaris & Chapman, 
supra note 4, at Part IV.B-C (citing cases). 
9. See, e.g., State v. Hathaway, 161 Wn. App. 634, 647, 251 P.3d 253 (2011). 
10. See Allen, 176 Wn.2d at 624 (C. Johnson, J., lead opinion); id. at 632 (Madsen, C.J., concurring); 
id. at 634 (Chambers, J., concurring). 
11. Allen, 176 Wn.2d at 632 (Madsen, C.J., concurring). 
12. Id. at 635 (Chambers, J., concurring); see also id. at 637 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). 
13. Id. at 624 n.6 (C. Johnson, J., lead opinion). 
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eyewitness identification does not warrant expert testimony or jury instruction in 
a given case, the identification should be excluded as too unreliable or prejudi-
cial. 
How should the jury be instructed? 
Based on research to date, the following instruction is likely to be effective:14 
The testimony given by an eyewitness is an expression of his or her beliefs and 
those beliefs may or may not be accurate. In general, researchers have found that 
eyewitness identifications in criminal investigations are incorrect approximately 
one-third of the time. You should take into account that the confidence dis-
played by an eyewitness does not necessarily indicate that the testimony is accu-
rate. It is possible for eyewitnesses to be confident and still be wrong. Or, eye-
witnesses may be unsure but still be correct in their identification. You should 
also take into account that people tend to have unique difficulty identifying per-
sons of another race, although this is not always the case. In experiments, eye-
witnesses trying to identify a stranger of a different race tend to make a misiden-
tification over 1.5 times more often than eyewitnesses identifying a stranger of 
the same race. If, after examining the testimony and all the evidence, you have 
reasonable doubt that a correct identification was made, you must find the de-
fendant not guilty. 
What about same-race identifications? 
Although cross-race identifications are more prone to error, same-race identifi-
cations also are often mistaken and result in wrongful convictions. Thus, many 
of the same considerations and principles should also apply to eyewitness identi-
fication in general. 
For a fuller discussion of these issues, including detailed legal analysis and cita-
tion to relevant authorities, see Taki V. Flevaris & Ellie F. Chapman, Cross-
Racial Misidentification: A Call to Action in Washington State and Beyond, 38 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 861 (2015). 
                                                 
14. See Flevaris & Chapman, supra note 4, at Part VI.B. 
